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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
To embarrass justice by a multiplicity of laws or to hazard it by corf-
dence in judges, are the opposite rocks on which all civil institutions
have been wrecked **
INTRODUCTION
In memoria for a lost cause. In 1985, the Minnesota
Supreme Court assessed the suitability of legal standards to
promote fair determination of child custody disputes. Consis-
tent with developments in case law and literature, the court, in
Pikula v. Pikula,' announced a firm preference for placement
of custody with a child's primary caretaker.2 The court empha-
sized the importance of the stability of the child's relationship
to a primary caretaker as a measure of the child's best inter-
ests.3 The Minnesota legislature, however, subsequently at-
tempted to reject the preference, in 19894 and again in 1990, 5
** Quotation from Samuel Johnson engraved outside chambers of the
Minnesota Supreme Court, State Capital Building, St. Paul.
1. 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985).
2. Id. at 711-12. The court deferred to appellate decisions in Ohio, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. See infra notes 27, 30, 31, 38, 41 (devel-
opments in these four states).
3. Reasoning that the child's relationship to a primary caretaker provides
"emotional and psychological stability," the court deferred to an observed
agreement of child psychologists on the importance of this stability in meeting
the child's best interests. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 711. The court cited J. GOLD-
sTam, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 31-
35 (1979); Leonard & Provence, The Development of Parent-Child Relations
and the Psychological Parent, 53 CONN. B.J. 320 (1979); Okpaku, Psychology:
Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1117, 1121-22
(1976); Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 335,
348 (1982).
4. Act of May 22, 1989, ch. 248, § 2, 1989 Minn. Laws 835-36 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1990)). In 1969, the Minnesota Legislature mandated
gender neutrality in selecting a custodial parent, declaring that the court
should consider "all facts in the best interests of the children" to decide cus-
tody cases. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1970). In 1974, the legislature announced 10
factors to be considered in evaluating the child's best interests - a statutory
pattern following the format of section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act of 1973. 9A U.L.A. 561 (1990). See infra note 24 (10 factors of Min-
nesota law before 1989). In Pikula, the supreme court announced a firm
preference in spite of the statutory best interests factors, explaining that the
preference coincided with four of the factors, and observing that other factors
were "both inherently resistant of evaluation and difficult to apply in any par-
ticular case." 374 N.W.2d at 711-12. The legislature's 1989 amendment adds
two best interest considerations of "the child's primary caretaker" and "the in-
timacy of the relationship between each parent and the child." 1989 Minn.
Laws 835, ch. 248, § 2. The legislature added this further declaration: "The
court may not use one factor to the exclusion of all others." Id. at 836, ch. 248,
§ 2.
5. Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 574, § 13, 1990 Minn. Laws 2131 (codified at
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declaring that primary caretaking is only one of several factors
to consider in deciding custody disputes. Responding to the
same pressures that led to the 1989 and 1990 legislation, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in 1988 had retreated from its own
earlier strong support of the preference.6 More recently, how-
ever, the court, while acknowledging the state's multi-factor
statute, renewed its support for the standard.7 Thus, although
the Minnesota legislature has rejected the primary caretaker
standard, the supreme court has not fully permitted the prefer-
ence to die.
Minnesota's experience exemplifies the tension in child
custody law between a need for predictable results and an
equally compelling need to freely consider variations in each
family situation." The supreme court intended for the primary
caretaker preference to provide a "bright line" standard for
child custody decisionmaking and to thereby reduce litigation
and provide more predictable results. The court's intent, how-
ever, conflicted with desires for trial court discretion sufficient
to serve the varied, best interests of children.
MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1990)). Restating its 1989 prohibition against exclusive
use of any statutory factor, the legislature declared: 'The primary caretaker
factor may not be used as a presumption in determining the best interests of
the child." Id. at 2132.
6. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 212 (Minn. 1988) (acknowledging
that Minnesota's multifactor statute, supra note 4, which says the child's best
interests means "all relevant factors," mandates a "multifaceted inquiry" into
all statutory factors).
7. Reviewing a trial court decision made before the 1989 legislature acted
on the caretaker preference, the court noted having said in Pikula that all
statutory factors were "plainly relevant," but disregarded the context of that
language and declared of a more objective, precise standard. Maxfield v. Max-
field, 452 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Minn. 1990). Reflecting on Pikula, the Maxfzeld
court wrote, "It was never intended, however, that custody be awarded to
whomever scored the most points on the Pikula caretaker scale (who bathed
the child, who put the child to bed at night, etc)." Id. Maxjield, however, also
appeared to breath some trace of new life into the primary caretaker consider-
ation. See infra text accompanying note 99, notes 233-35. This facet of Max-
fteld produced the legislative reiteration in 1990 of its intent to terminate a
caretaker preference. See supra note 5.
8. Thus, child custody adjudication "poses a genuine dilemma."
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Inde-
terminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 292 (Summer, 1975). See also R.
NEELY, THE DIVORCE DECISION 39-40 (1984) (predictability gives way to flexi-
bility); Pearson & Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in Contested Custody
Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703, 704-05, 718-23 (1983) (detailing the conflicting needs
for rules and discretion in child custody cases); Scott & Derdeyn, Rethinking
Joint Custody, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 455, 463-69 (1984) (contrasting application costs
of loose standard with "definition" errors of more precise standard).
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
This dilemma is perhaps the foremost, recurrent example
of the struggle in Anglo-American law to reconcile a preference
for decisionmaking according to the rule of law with a conflict-
ing desire for trial court discretion sufficient to meet the inter-
ests of justice. Generations of Americans have ceremonially
honored a long history of dedication to the rule of law,9 a tradi-
tion begun in the seventeenth century10 in England. 1 Ameri-
can dedication to a system of rigid laws, however, has been
willingly diminished to permit discretionary resolution of an
exploding number of legal conflicts.'2 This desire for discre-
tionary justice reflects a tentative faith in the ability of deci-
sionmakers to carefully assess individual situations while
9. The sentiment is by all means alive in the twentieth century. One
voice among many declares: "Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is
more destructive of freedom than any of man's other inventions." United
States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
10. English lawyer John Selden highlighted problems with unlimited dis-
cretion in his celebrated condemnation of the equity courts, where he found
the law as predictable as the length of the Chancellor's foot. J. SELDEN, TA-
BLE-TALK 46 (E. Arber rev. ed. 1985) (1689). In 1705, Lord Camden reportedly
described the discretion of a judge as "The Law of Tyrants." Pound, Discre-
tion, Dspesation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special
Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1960). Of discretionary decisionmaking, Cam-
den is said to have observed: "It is always unknown; it is different in different
men; it is casual and depends upon constitution, temper, and passion. In the
best it is often times caprice; in the worst it is every vice, folly and passion to
which human nature is liable." Id. Two millennia earlier, Aristotle gave us
the notion that "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be
decided by judges." ARISTOTE, RHETORic, Bk. 1, Ch. 1.
11. Early in the 19th century, Lord Chancellor Eldon proclaimed a reform
discipline - a determination to respect fixed principles. Gee v. Pritchard, 36
Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (1818). "Nothing would inflict on me greater pain, in quit-
ting this place, than the recollection that I had done any thing to justify the
reproach that the equity of this Court varies like the Chancellor's foot." Id.
Even in this century, England's A.V. Dicey observed that the rule of law in
England "excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of
wide discretionary authority on the part of the government." A. DICEY, INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 198 (8th ed. 1915).
In the shadow of these developments, the American states shunned courts of
equity. Chief Justice John Marshall confirmed the emphatic recognition of
government in the United States as "a government of laws, and not of men."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
12. In this century, with the mushrooming of special judicial problems, es-
pecially on matters of personal and family welfare, and the emergence of ad-
ministrative proceedings, discretionary authority has been given its place based
on a theory of necessity. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 24-27
(1959). If this defies the rule of law, it has been observed, "then the rule of
law is inapplicable to any modern constitution." Id. at 25 (quoting E. WADE &
G. PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54 (5th ed. 1955)).
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avoiding undisciplined abuse of general principles.'3 The re-
sulting tension between the conflicting goals of discretion and
certainty is apparent in many family law matters'4 and has be-
come more troubling as courts increasingly assume the respon-
sibility of settling such cases.' 5
This Article examines Minnesota's experience with the pri-
mary caretaker preference. Part I describes the origins of the
standard and the attention given to primary caretaking by
scholars and by the appellate courts of sixteen states. Part II
examines the rationales for a legal preference or presumption
favoring a child's primary caretaker. These include concern for
child stability and desire for a system free of the pain and injus-
tice of child custody litigation. Part III studies the potential in-
effectiveness of a caretaker preference as demonstrated in
Minnesota. This section describes three developments that con-
tributed to the failure of the standard to curb litigation: an
overly broad definition of caretaking, expansive exceptions to
the general presumption, and a narrow standard of appellate
review. Part IV examines the cost of the caretaker preference
to child and parental interests that might be sacrificed to
achieve more certainty. It presents criticisms of the standard,
many of them overstated, and possible explanations of why op-
ponents rejected the standard.
13. To Dean Pound, the dilemma of rules and discretion required an un-
defined balancing, "a standing problem of the science of law." Pound, supra
note 10, at 937. Pound found a case for discretion "until experience developed
by reason or legislation can work out and formulate a principle of law." Id. at
929. Although finding discretion necessary, Pound pleaded for a discipline of
"caution," the "just and wise exercise of discretion," a "reasoned decision in
the light of principles." Id. at 926-29. He viewed the exercise of discretion as a
demonstration of a "disciplined" feeling of judges, a process that was "part of
the every day apparatus of justice" and "not outside of the legal order." Id.
14. The friction will be found prominently on other issues within the
topic of family law. See, e.g., Garfinkel & Melli, The Use of Normative Stan-
dards in Family Law Decisions: Developing Mathematical Standards for
Child Support, 24 FAM. L.Q. 157 (1990). Courts encounter a similar dilemma in
child protection proceedings, delinquency dispositions - especially for so-
called status offenses - and hospitalization of children for psychological treat-
ment. See, e.g., Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth, An
Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 773 (1988).
15. A study on family law standards is no longer a matter on the fringes
of the American judicial experience. For calendar year 1987, in an unpub-
lished report, the Minnesota State Court Administrator recorded 4880 Minne-
sota trials in family, juvenile and commitment matters - 48% of all trial
proceedings for the year. These fields accounted for 73,484 filings - 52% of




Twenty years ago, when reporting on proposed custody
standards to the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Professors Levy and Ellsworth observed
that "the interdisciplinary millennium - for custody adjudica-
tion at any rate - is not -at hand.' 6 As Minnesota's experience
with the primary caretaker preference demonstrates, the mil-
lennium is no nearer today than it was in 1969.17 Minnesota's
experience can, however, hasten the arrival of the millennium:
it teaches the need for proponents to more carefully evaluate
the risk that the preference might compromise important child
and parent interests, to acknowledge the price to be paid for a
more certain standard, and to effectively demonstrate that the
value of the preference justifies its cost. It also suggests the
need for alternatives other than standards to resolve custody
disputes.
I. ORIGINS AND CURRENT SUPPORT FOR THE
PRIMARY CARETAKER PREFERENCE
Until the nineteenth century, American law rarely denied
custody to a child's father.'8 The vehicle for breaking this rigid
16. Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication,
4 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 167, 202 (1969). Dean Pound observed in 1960: "T]he life
of today is too complex and its circumstances are too varied and too variable to
make possible, in practice, reduction to rules of everything with which the re-
gime of justice according to law must deal." Pound, supra note 10, at 927-28,
931, 936. Without discretion, Pound observed, decisionmakers inevitably re-
sort to fictions, which he described as "authoritative presumptions that certain
exceptional cases are within the appointed rule or that what is done under cer-
tain special facts is what the rule calls for, although it is not so in fact but is so
only 'in the eyes of the law."' Id. at 927. Likewise, the process of interpreta-
tion "is made to give a meaning within the rule to facts not within it so as to
reach the result required by the rule." Id.
17. Professor Mnookin, in his 1975 study of standard-setting, likewise
found the prospect for identifying a usable standard "very problematic," at the
present time. Mnookin, supra note 8, at 292. See also Scott & Derdeyn, supra
note 8, at 498 (goal to design a satisfactory legal rule on custody placements
"will probably never be realized"). In one of his last contributions to
America's legal literature, Dean Pound surveyed the custody issue and gave us
what still looks to be a final analysis. He categorized child custody proceed-
ings as among those in which compelling considerations "cannot be reduced to
rules." Pound, supra note 10, at 929. In these cases, Pound added, "judicial
determination must be left, to no small extent, to the disciplined but no less
personal feeling of the judge for what justice demands." Id.
18. The history of child custody law has been frequently recorded. See,
e.g., Cochran, The Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests of
the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody
Preferences, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 6-14 (1985); Mnookin, supra note 8, at 232-
37; O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preference for the Primary Caretaker
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rule was the doctrine of serving the child's best interests, a
principle that developed chiefly out of conflicts between par-
ents and alternative caretakers. This doctrine views the child's
welfare as superior to any inconsistent interests of either par-
ent. Thus, the primary goal of courts is to secure the best inter-
ests of the child. Commentators frequently trace the
predominance of best interests law in dissolution cases to the
declarations of Judge Cardozo in Finlay v. Finlay.9 Also most
important toward establishing the standard, however, was the
1895 Flint opinion,2 0 authored by Justice William Mitchell, in
which the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that a child's in-
terests were superior to the then absolute statutory rights of
the father.2 '
Early in the twentieth century, most courts adopted a new
parental preference derived from the child's best interests.
This preference, the tender years doctrine, presumed that chil-
dren of tender years should be in the custody of their mother.22
It provided a standard for decisionmakers, thereby avoiding
substantial trial court discretion. By 1970, however, most states
abolished the tender years doctrine; citing evidence that parent-
ing patterns no longer supported the tender years rationale,
as Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REv. 481, 486-89 (1987); Polikoff, Why Are Mothers
Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7
WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 235, 235-36 (1982); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at
464-69; Note, A Step Backward: The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts a "Pri-
mary Caretaker" Presumption in Child Custody Cases: Pikula v. Pikula, 70
MINN. L. REv. 1344, 1347-51 (1986).
19. 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
20. State ex rel Flint v. Flint, 63 Minn. 187, 65 N.W. 272 (1895).
21. Id. at 189, 65 N.W. at 273. In Flint, the Minnesota Supreme Court af-
firmed placement of custody with the child's mother. Id. The court subscribed
to an arrangement most beneficial for the child, in spite of a state statute de-
daring the absolute custodial rights of the father. Id. Thus, the court honored
the doctrine on child welfare as one tantamount to a constitutional principle,
the basis for judicial prerogative to contradict a legislative act. Justice Mitch-
ell explained
Now, while, under our statutes, the father is given the right to
the custody of his minor children, yet this right is not an absolute
legal right, beyond the control of the courts. The cardinal principle in
such matters is to regard the benefit of the infant paramount to the
claims of either parent. While courts will not lightly interfere with
what may be termed the "natural rights of parents," yet the primary
object of all courts, at least in America, is to secure the welfare of the
child, and not the special claims of one or the other parent.
Id.
22. See Crippen & Hatling, Is There Gender Neutrality in Minnesota Cus-
tody Decisions?, 9 HAI.INE L. REV. 411, 413-14 (1986); O'Kelly, supra note 18,
at 487; Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 465.
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they determined that custody decisionmaking should favor
neither parent.23 In addition, many states enumerated factors
other than gender to govern the custody decision.24 As a conse-
quence of these developments, trial courts exercised greater
discretion in child custody disputes.
As the tender years preference died, appellate courts inevi-
tably sought more specificity to guide child custody decision-
making. Courts in at least sixteen states have identified and
showed some favor for the parent who had been the primary
caregiver before the couple separated.2 Furthermore, courts
from at least seven of these states have identified primary care-
taking as a significant factor in assessing the child's best inter-
ests.26  Courts from five states, although declaring the
23. See Crippen & Hatling, supra note 22, at 413; Mnookin, supra note 8,
at 235-36; Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 466. The Minnesota Legislature
determined in 1969 that the judiciary "shall not prefer one parent over the
other" in custody decisions. Act of June 6, 1969, ch. 1030, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws
2081 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1969)).
24. See Mnookin, supra note 8, at 236-37. The Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act prescribed best interests factors in 1973. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DI-
VORCE AcT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1990). Minnesota enacted statutory factors in
1974. Act of Mar. 28, 1974, ch. 330, § 2, 1974 Minn. Laws 555, 556 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1974)). A child's best interests, the Minnesota
Legislature declared, "means the sum total of [enumerated] factors to be con-
sidered and evaluated by the court." Id. As amended prior to 1989, these fac-
tors were as follows:
(a) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;(b) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of sufficient age to express preference;
(c) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with a parent or
parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly af-
fect the child's best interests;
(d) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
(e) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory en-
vironment and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(f) the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed cus-
todial home;
(g) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(h) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love,
affection, and guidance, and to continue educating and raising
the child in the child's culture and religion or creed, if any;
(i) the child's cultural background; and
(j) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if related to
domestic abuse .... that has occurred between the parents.
MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1988).
25. See infra notes 26-30, 34, 41-42.
26. Califomia: Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 535, 540, 724 P.2d 486,
488, 492, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802, 806 (1986) (numerous additional considerations
deemed insignificant compared to fact that mother had always been the child's
primary caretaker); Catherine D. v. Dennis B., 220 Cal. App. 3d 922, 269 Cal.
Rptr. 547, 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (primary caretaker unsuccessful where
[Vol. 75:427
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importance of primary caretaking, have rejected it as a pre-
sumptive determinant of custody. 2 In North Dakota, this re-
jection has been a repeated response to a single justice's
strong evidence of mother's open and hostile efforts to destroy child's relation-
ship with father).
Delaware: Maureen F.G. v. George W.G., 445 A.2d 934, 935-36 (Del. 1982)
(primary parenting deemed a proper consideration).
Florida: Agudo v. Agudo, 411 So. 2d 249, 250 (FI. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (af-
firms placement with primary caretaker).
Massachusetts: Rolde v. Rolde, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 405, 425 N.E.2d 388,
392 (1981) (primary caretaking considered "highly significant," a "critical" con-
sideration); Angelone v. Angelone, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 730, 404 N.E.2d 672,
673 (1980) (primary caretaking a special consideration).
Missouri: Riaz v. Riaz, 789 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (appellate
court begins best interests analysis with observation of substantial evidence
that mother had been primary caretaker of children); Leach v. Leach, 660
S.W.2d 761, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (court cites father's primary care of three-
year-old as basis for exception from tender years doctrine).
Montana: Burleigh v. Burleigh, 200 Mont. 1, 6, 650 P.2d 753, 755 (1982)
(affirms placement where trial court recites primary caretaking as considera-
tion).
New York: Crum v. Crum, 122 A.D.2d 771, 771, 505 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (primary caretaking a factor to be considered, but over-
ridden here by other considerations); Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 119 A.D.2d 945,
945-46, 501 N.Y.S2d 216, 217 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (trial court's singular refer-
ence to primary caretaking found to be a proper indication of child's best in-
terests); Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc.2d 641, 648, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978) (trial court highlights primary caretaking role).
See also Annotation, Primary Caretaker Role of Respective Parents as Fac-
tar in Awarding Custody of Child, 41 A.L.R, 4TH 1129, 1138-64 (1985).
27. Iowa: In re Marriage of Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Iowa 1982) (cus-
tody reversed with notation that mother had been child's primary parent); In
re Marriage of Ertmann, 376 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (affirming
primary caretaker's custody, but insisting that decision not rest "solely on past
parenting behavior").
North Dakota: See in~fra note 28.
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth er rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super.
421, 425-26, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1982) (declaring that role as primary caretaker
is a "substantial factor" that must be weighed in adjudicating custody); Moore
v. Moore, 393 Pa. Super. 256, 574 A.2d 105, 108 (1990) (father's primary care-
taking cited to explain reversal of modification); Michael T.L. v. Marilyn J.L.,
363 Pa. Super. 42, 525 A.2d 414, 420-21 (1987) (stating that positive weight must
be given to the primary caretaker factor); Beers v. Beers, 342 Pa. Super. 465,
493 A.2d 116, 119 (1985) (primary caretaking highlighted in affirming custody
award); Brooks v. Brooks, 319 Pa. Super. 268, 277, 466 A 2d 152, 156-57 (1983)
(determining that primary caretaking is "only one factor to be considered").
Utah: Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986) (primary caretaking is
prominent among child custody considerations, but other factors permit disre-
garding this evidence); Jensen v. Jensen, 775 P.2d 436, 438 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) trial court's identification of primary caretaker is not alone sufficient to
sustain denial of modification); Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (considers several factors, including primary caretaking, as promi-
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strenuous advocacy for a stronger preference. 28 In 1989, the
Minnesota legislature became the first state to expressly in-
clude primary caretaking as a factor to be considered in child
custody disputes.29
Except for Minnesota, no state has engaged in more appel-
late discussion about primary caretaking than Ohio. In 1982,
the Ohio Court of Appeals held that primary caretaking was
entitled to strong consideration, but not presumptive status.30
Ohio cases decided after 1985 show a disregard for the factor.3 '
nent); Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (considers pri-
mary caretaking merely one of various relevant facts).
Vermont: Harris v. Harris, 149 Vt. 410, 418, 546 A.2d 208, 214 (1988)
(although primary caretaking presumption would be inconsistent with statute,
factor should be given "great weight"); Peckham v. Peckham, 149 Vt. 388, 389,
543 A.2d 267, 268 (1988) (although significance of primary caretaking "must
not be underemphasized," it remains one of many considerations under statute
enumerating best interest factors).
28. Heggen v. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d 96, 101 (N.D. 1990) (affirming trial
court's highlighting of primary caretaker evidence); Dinius v. Dinius, 448
N.W.2d 210, 213 (N.D. 1989) (majority finding that mother's primary caretak-
ing does not require correcting a placement of four children with father; dis-
sent of Justice Levine contends majority overlooks trial court's complete
disregard of primary caretaking, and thus gives only lip service to the matter
of law that caretaking is a factor meriting consideration under North Dakota's
statutory scheme); Von Bank v. Von Bank, 443 N.W.2d 618, 620 (N.D. 1989)
(with Justice Levine concurring only in result, majority rejects giving pre-
sumptive weight to caretaking factor); Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496,
497 (N.D. 1989) (primary caretaker argument disregarded); Roen v. Roen, 438
N.W.2d 170, 174 (N.D. 1989) (finding child's relationship "with nurturing par-
ent" a "very important aspect of stability"); Branson v. Branson, 411 N.W.2d
395, 400 (N.D. 1987) (recognizing primary caretaking as only one of many con-
siderations, over dissent advocating adoption of primary caretaker preference);
Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 622 (N.D. 1986) (same).
29. See supra note 4 (Minnesota Legislature includes primary caretaking
as one of many factors, declaring that none are to be exclusive). A 1986 Mas-
sachusetts legislative enactment, unique in the nation but applicable only in
paternity cases, specifically mandates preservation of a child's primary care-
taker parent relationship. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C § 10 (West 1989).
Multi-factor statutory provisions have prompted some courts to reject giving
preferential weight to primary care. See infra note 27. For a review of the
variations in statutory standards, see Mnookin, supra note 8, at 235-37.
30. In re Maxwell, 8 Ohio App. 3d 302, 304-06, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1220-23
(1982).
31. Loncaric v. Loncaric, No. 462 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12, 1988) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file) (observing primary caretaker factor as "an important
phrase," but only one part of the broader consideration of the child's relation-
ships); Kowalski v. Kowalski, No. 1834 (Ohio Ct. App. May 6, 1988) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file) (although primary caretaker analysis may be em-
ployed, rejects primary caretaker argument because standard is not presump-
tive); Crout v. Crout, No. CA86-09-014 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1987) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file) (treating primary caretaking as "only one factor");
PRIMARY CARETAKER PREFERENCE
Notwithstanding these developments, however, the Ohio Court
of Appeals appears to have created a de facto preference in
many recent cases, including three decisions since March
1990;32 in addition to affirming at least five decisions evidently
premised on primary caretaking, the court has issued at least
seven reversals to restore custody with a primary parent.3
Thompson v. Thompson, 31 Ohio App. 3d 254, 257, 511 N.E.2d 412, 415 (1987)
(primary caretaking treated as an unwritten "part" of the statutory scheme,
but not a "magical" factor and one the trial court need not specifically ad-
dress); Watson v. Watson, No. 3692 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1985) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file) (stating that primary caretaking is "certainly a fac-
tor," but not presumptive).
In addition, at least twenty other cases reject the alleged primary care-
taker's claims of error, only sometimes with an explanation of unusual circum-
stances. See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, No. E-87-11 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1987)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (trial court finding that unsuccessful appel-
lant was a primary caretaker); Young v. Young, No. 4165 (Ohio Ct. App. June
3, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (George, J., concurring) (finding it
nearly an abuse of discretion to neglect a determination of primary caretaking,
especially where other factors are relatively equal, and that primary caretak-
ing is entitled to "considerable weight" with younger children).
32. Glover v. Glover, No. CA89-09-015 (Ohio Ct. App. June 11, 1990)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (error to ignore importance of primary care-
taking); Berry v. Berry, No. CA88-11-081 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1990)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (evidence of equal caretaking shows error in
trial court finding that father was primary parent, and holds trial court abused
its discretion in not treating tender years of child as a factor, one that "may be
the determinative factor," when issue close); Seibert v. Seibert, No. CA89-05-
040 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (finds
abuse of discretion where primary caretaking given too little importance rela-
tive to other factors).
33. A half dozen affirmances include Gruebel v. Gruebel, No. 85-CA-39
(Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) and Biller v.
Biller, No. CA89-05-036 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, States library,
Ohio file).
Reversals include Townsend v. Townsend, No. 1876 (Ohio Ct. App. June 5,
1989) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (reversing on a clear record that appel-
lant was the primary caregiver); Masters v. Masters, No. 88-CA-7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 7, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (error to disregard undis-
puted evidence that one parent was the primary caretaker); Dom v. Dom, No.
CA87-07-099 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file)
(although deferring to the totality of the circumstances and a "multitude of
factors" favoring the appellant, court observes that removing the child from
the primary caretaker "makes no sense"); Bechtol v. Bechtol, No. CA88-02-014
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 6, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file), rev'd, 49 Ohio
St. 3d 21, 550 N.E.2d 178 (1990) (reversing because appellant has always been
the custodian and caretaker for the child). In 1990, the Ohio Supreme Court
reversed the Bechtol decision, finding that the intermediate court offended its
standard of review. Bechtol v. Bechtol, 49 Ohio St. 3d 21, 23, 550 N.E.2d 178,
180 (1990). The Bechtol court noted, however, that tender years of children is




In 1977, the Oregon Court of Appeals recognized the im-
portance of primary caretaking, although without creating a
presumption or preference. In Derby,-s the court held that a
mother's primary parenting "dictate[d]" reversal of the trial
court's placement with the fatherse The Oregon Court of Ap-
peals also reported elements of physical caregiving by a pri-
mary parent that became the basis for the definition of primary
parenting in West Virginia and Minnesota.1 Subsequently, the
Oregon intermediate appellate court twice more reversed on a
primary parent's appeal,ss but an inconsistent decision occurred
during the same period of time.39 Inexplicably, the issue did
not arise again in an Oregon appellate review after 1983.40
West Virginia4 ' and Minnesota2 are the only states in
which state appellate courts have specifically prescribed a pri-
mary caretaker preference. No states have adopted the stan-
dard since the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Pikula in
34. In re Marriage of Derby, 31 Or. App. 803, 807, 571 P.2d 562, 564 (1977),
modified on other grounds, 31 Or. App. 1333, 572 P.2d 1080 (1977).
35. Id. at 807, 571 P.2d at 564.
36. Id.
37. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981); Pikula v. Pikula,
374 N.W.2d 705, 713-14 (Minn. 1985). See text accompanying infra note 45 (dis-
cussing Garska).
38. In re Marriage of Tuttle, 62 Or. App. 281, 285, 660 P.2d 196, 199 (1983)
(reversal premised on observer's testimony that mother had "slight edge as the
primary parent," a factor the court considered relevant and important); In re
Marriage of Van Dyke, 48 Or. App. 965, 969, 618 P.2d 465, 467 (1980) (reversal
premised solely on mother's role as primary parent - a "dominant
consideration").
39. In re Marriage of Jewell, 49 Or. App. 903, 620 P.2d 967 (1980) (within
months after Van Dyke, the majority affirms disregard for primary caretaker,
premising its decision on evidence extraneous to parent-child relationship).
40. Save for an inconsequential 1987 amendment, Oregon's multifactor
custody statute, enacted in 1975, has remained unchanged. OR. REv. STAT.
§ 107.137 (1987).
41. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 361. See David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d
912, 923-25 (W. Va. 1989) (reaffirms preference and clarifies rationale); see also
Heck v. Heck, 301 S.E.2d 158, 160 (W. Va. 1982) (reverses placement of two
children where trial court refused to follow Garska, finding it "clearly
wrong").
42. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712. Neither Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v.
Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. 421, 448 A.2d 1113 (1982), nor In re Maxwell, 8 Ohio
App. 3d 302, 456 N.E.2d 1218 (1982), both cited by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, stand for the strong preference adopted in Pikula. See discussion of
Jordan and Brooks v. Brooks, 319 Pa. Super. 268, 466 A.2d 152 (1983), supra
note 27, and discussion of Maxwell and progeny, supra notes 30-33 and accom-
panying text. On the other hand, Garska and Van Dyke, cited in Pikula, were
duly supportive. See also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (Oregon);
supra note 41 and accompanying text (West Virginia).
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1985. Following subsequent developments in Minnesota, West
Virginia now alone retains a firm preference. Notwithstanding
this relatively limited judicial support, numerous legal articles
advocate the preference. 43
The elements of a primary caretaker preference are not
complicated on their face. Primary caretaking, according to the
formula set forth by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Gar-
ska v. McCoy,44 and subsequently adopted in Pikula, is mea-
sured by examining prior patterns of care, with a focus on
physical care of the child. The Garska court associated the fol-
lowing functions with primary caretaking: preparing and plan-
ning of meals; bathing, grooming and dressing;, purchasing and
cleaning clothing, providing medical care; providing transporta-
tion for after-school activities; arranging alternative care, such
as babysitting; putting the child to bed at night, attending to the
child in the middle of the night, and waking the child in the
morning; disciplining the child; educating the child in areas
such as religion and culture; and teaching elementary skills.4
The West Virginia court attributed identification of these
43. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SoNT & S. GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST IN-
TEREST OF THE CHILD 68 n.25 (1986) (recommending drawing of lots to decide
dispute between parents where both have psychological bond with child); R.
NEELY, supra note 8, at 79-83 (elaborating on rationale for primary caretaker
preference); Cochran, supra note 18, at 42, 46-65 (preference balanced with
provision for extensive contact with secondary caretaker and recommended
for children of all ages); Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Lan-
guage, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REV.
727, 770-74 (1988) (pronounced criticism of practices without preference and
suggesting that preference extend to children of all ages); Neely, The Primary
Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 168, 180-86 (1984) (author of Garska explains West Virginia stan-
dard); O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 483 (complimenting North Dakota Supreme
Court Justice Levine's advocacy of primary caretaker standard); Polikoff,
supra note 18, at 242 (early endorsement of Garska, observing utility of prefer-
ence as alternative to joint custody by parents engaged in shared childrearing);
Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism The Maternal Presumption Revisited,
1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107 (1978) (insightful view of feminist advocacy for gen-
der neutrality); see also Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 16, at 203 (1969 call for
preference of mothers, based on rationale subsequently identified as primary
caretaker preference); Klaff, supra note 3, at 342-48 (proposing merit for
tender years doctrine or primary caretaking variation); cf. Chambers, Rethink-
ing the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV.
477, 480 (1984) (author's recommendations for custody rules - that children
remain with the primary caretaker and that court power to impose joint cus-
tody be limited - made with "disturbing tenuousness," and supported by re-
search pointing at result with a "quivering finger").
44. 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
45. Id. See also Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Minn. 1985).
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factors to the Oregon Court of Appeals.46 In Derby, the Oregon
court had held that the mother was the primary caretaker.4 7
During the marriage, she had been a homemaker. She cleaned
the house, cooked, nursed and cared for the family, and coun-
seled and disciplined the children. The husband worked
outside the home for eight to ten hours a day. Although the
husband dedicated much time and attention to the children, the
court found that the mother performed primary caretaking
functions.48 The Oregon court also emphasized the "close and
successful emotional relationship" that the mother enjoyed
with the children, independent of her role as the primary
caretaker.49
II. THE RATIONALE FOR A PRIMARY CARETAKER
PREFERENCE
Interest in a caretaker preference constitutes the current
stage in a well-developed body of thought on placement of chil-
dren after divorce. Although potential defects in the standard
are apparent, the underlying rationale is thoughtful and impor-
tant. Proponents of a preference assert that such a standard
benefits all interests involved in the custody decision, including
interests of the judiciary.5° They provide three justifications
for the primary caretaker preference: protection of the child's
most vital parent-child relationship, avoidance of error, litiga-
tion and abusive threats of litigation, and compatibility with
gender neutrality and the child's many interests.
A. PROTECTION OF PARENT-CHILD BONDING
A broad, unlimited custody standard has existed for nearly
two decades.51 During this period, legal authorities have in-
46. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
47. In re Marriage of Derby, 31 Or. App. 803, 806-07, 571 P.2d 562, 564,
modifted on other grounds, 31 Or. App. 1333, 572 P.2d 1080 (1977).
48. Id.
49. Id. Previewing a problem discussed later in this article, it is evident
that Garska and Pikula disregarded the Oregon court's significant emphasis
on the mother's "close and successful emotional relationship" with the
children.
50. Professor O'Kelly comprehensively reviews the reasons for the prefer-
ence in her 1987 article. O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 524-33. Justice Beryl J. Le-
vine, in the minority opinions of North Dakota, reviews the rationale
employed in other courts. See supra note 28. West Virginia Chief Justice
Richard Neely offers a restatement of the rationale in David M. v. Margaret
M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 916-18 (W. Va. 1989).
51. See supra notes 23, 24 and accompanying text.
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creasingly emphasized the child's interest in preserving its
stronger parent-child bond - an identifiable interest "beyond"
the child's general "best interests." 52 Many commentators, 3 in-
cluding the Goldstein-Freud-Solnit group,M4 support the pri-
mary caretaker preference as an effective means to protect
bonded relationships. Several appellate courts have also associ-
ated caretaking with bonding.'5
The primary caretaker preference is not unique in its at-
tempt to protect bonded relationships; other legal rules recog-
nize this rationale. For much of this century, for example, non-
parents have succeeded in custody claims for children based on
their long-term care of a child. 6 More recently, some statutes,
52. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREuD & A. SoLNIT, supra note 3 at 31-34, 53-64
(1973); cf Mnookin, supra note 8, at 283-87 (challenging whether experts or
decisionmakers can normally measure the relative psychological worth of al-
ternative parental relationships).
53. See Chambers, supra note 43, at 527-38 (reviewing support and misgiv-
ings for protecting child's most bonded relationships); Charlow, Awarding Cus-
tody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 267, 274-75 (1987) (Goldstein's psychological parent "doctrine" a sophisti-
cated variation on the legal presumption for primary caretakers); Elster, Solo-
monic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 1,
11 (1987) (importance of preserving strong relationship is part of conventional
wisdom underlying primary caretaker preference); O'Kelly, supra note 18, at
484-85, 511-17 (contention for primary caretaker preference grounded in bond-
ing concepts associated with Goldstein and his colleagues); Reidy, Silver &
Carlson, Child Custody Decisions: A Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q. 75, 83, 85
(1989) (even without legal presumption, bonding and primary caretaking high
among criteria actually employed by judges); Wexler, Rethinking the Modifi-
cation of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 803-18 (1985) (discussing
constitutional dimensions in protecting existing relationships).
54. The authors of the 1973 volume, J. GOLDSTEiN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNT,
supra note 3, later herald the primary caretaker preference. J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD, A. SOLNT & S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 66-67. In 1973, the au-
thors proposed a standard (the "least detrimental alternative"), which would
prompt decisionmakers to dwell on avoiding harm. This concept, however,
had little utility for lawmakers attempting to express a useable standard for
custody decisions. Id. at 70-71, 84-85. Cf. infra note 120 (tenuous link between
physical care and bonded relationship).
55. See Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 535, 540, 724 P.2d 486, 488, 492,
229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802, 806 (1986) (connecting primary caretaking with judicial
recognition that stability and continuity for child are important); Pikula v.
Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn. 1985) (Minnesota court finds foundation for
preference in literature on child's need for stability); Beers v. Beers, 342 Pa.
Super. 465, 493 A.2d 116, 119 (1985) (recognizing utility of primary caretaker
"doctrine" to preserve bonded relationship).
56. See J. GOLDSTEm, A. FREuD, A. SOLNIT & S. GOLDSTEiN, supra note
43, at 57-62, 188-89 (discussing Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881), which con-
tains language prophetic of the primary caretaker preference); O'Kelly, supra
note 18, at 549-54 (North Dakota law); Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390,
1400, 140 N.W.2d 152, 158 (preservation of long period of care is the unpub-
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following a provision of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
have enlarged longstanding judicial doctrines against modifica-
tion of original custody decisions.57 Other statutory provisions
contain a. strong presumption against change of custodial ar-
rangements in ex parte proceedings upon commencement of a
divorce case.-s The tender years doctrine, as well as other for-
mulations of a preference for mothers, also reflects this desire
to protect strong parent-child relationships.59
Supporters also contend that, in addition to preserving im-
portant relationships, a primary caretaker preference might
promote the development of stronger parent-child bondings °
Their rationale is that knowing that the more active caretaker
will receive custody in the event of a divorce might prompt
both parents to become more involved with their children.6 1
B. PROMOTION OF CERTAINTY
The justification for a primary caretaker preference, how-
ever, includes more than a desire to preserve bonded parent-
child relationships. Supporters also propose the preference as a
needed reform for a flawed process of decisionmaking. Their
criticism reflects the historic political and legal concern about
licized premise of a much-publicized case), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966);
State ex rel. Anderson v. Anderson, 89 Minn. 198, 201, 94 N.W. 681, 682 (1903)
(first in long line of Minnesota cases protecting continuance of a child's estab-
lished custodial care by a non-parent); Richards v. Collins, 45 N.J. Eq. 283, 17
A. 831 (1889) (protection of longstanding non-parent custody).
57. UNi. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr § 409, 9A U.L.A. 628 (1973) (absent
change by consent of already implemented custody decree, the proponent of
the modification must show health of child endangered in present circum-
stances). See Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712-14. The Pikula court recognized an
exception where strong evidence shows that the primary parent is unfit and
where placement with this parent is likely to endanger the child's health.
Thus, the court employs the modification language of MWNN. STAT. § 518.18
(1984), which is modeled after Uniform Act § 409. See also Commonwealth ex
rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. 421, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1982) (introduc-
ing primary parent preference as a basis for reversing modification); Wexler,
supra note 53, at 760, 779 (limit on modification is aimed at stability, finality of
judgments and avoidance of litigation but courts tend to loosely permit modifi-
cation, especially following consent decrees); Note, supra note 18, at 1371-72
(modification standard, like primary caretaker preference, reflects concern for
stability).
58. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.131, subd. 3(b) (1988).
59. See Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1, 24-25
(1990) (discussing proposition of legal preference for mothers as custodians).
60. See Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712 n.2; cf. Elster, supra note 53, at 9
(although fathers discouraged by tender years doctrine, best interests rule
gives them incentive for caregiving); Fineman, supra note 43, at 773.
61. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712 n.2.
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broad legal rules that provide virtually unlimited discretion to
decisionmakers. Proponents of the preference contend that it
is a means to avoid delegation of a dangerous breadth of
discretion.62
Broad legal standards present a serious problem to an
American judicial system committed to the rule of law. The
narrow standard of appellate review present in many states in-
tensifies the problem.63 It leaves the trial courts with nearly
unbridled discretion to decide child custody disputes. The rec-
ord of appellate review in Minnesota, for example, demon-
strates remarkably little interference with trial court custody
decisions,64 despite the supreme court's obvious endeavor to fa-
62. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text. Criticism of judicial dis-
cretion includes consideration of: (1) the special tendencies of judges to err in
family matters - a topic that must take into account the capacity of judges in
terms of their ability to assess personal needs, (2) their interest in personal
and family welfare cases, (3) their temperament toward personal and family
conduct - especially when in conflict with the court's will, and (4) their pro-
clivity, due to the judicial role in civil and criminal litigation, to dwell more on
choice of winners (and losers) than on solving problems in human relation-
ships. J. GOLDSTEiN, A. FREUD, A. SoLNrr & S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at
62-68 (reviewing pitfalls for decisionmakers, especially in employing personal
values); S. KATz, WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO FAMILY
BREAKDOWN 81 (1971) (enormity of power in exercising discretion to "reorgan-
ize families according to their own values, biases, and prejudices"); R. NEELY,
supra note 8, at 39, 168 (deploring consequence of action by the inevitable
judges who misuse discretionary power); Charlow, supra note 53, at 271-73
(tendency of decisions to reflect judges' personal values, or interests of par-
ents); Fair, Family Law - 'Whither Now?', 1 J. DIvORCE 31, 40 (1977) (discre-
tion exercised according to personality, temperament, background, interests,
and prejudices); Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody
Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55, 61-70 (1969) (characteristics of
moralizing, seeking "completely correct" solutions, inability to understand
child's needs or to solve problems); see also infra note 66 (quoting Pikula, 374
N.W.2d at 713); infa note 73 (tension for decisionmakers).
63. In Minnesota and many other states, a narrow standard of review,
guaranteeing deference to the trial court absent an abuse of discretion, has
governed appellate review of custody decisions. Wallin v. Wallin, 290 Minn.
261, 267, 187 N.W.2d 627, 631 (1971) (initiating the demand for particularized
findings in the exercise of broad discretion). See Mnookin, supra note 8, at 254
(narrow standard of review); Pound, supra note 10, at 932-33 (defining abuse of
discretion as the "failure to exercise the granted power conscientiously and ad-
visedly - without considered judgment, offhand, carelessly, hastily, or with
bad motives" and observing the tendency of reviewing courts to upset only
"clearly" unreasonable decisions); Note, Courting Reversal.. The Supervisory
Role of State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191, 1210 (1978) (general low rate
of reversal in family law cases); cf infra note 237 (in 1990, Minnesota
Supreme Court called for careful examination of trial court rationale where
misapplication of law may have occurred).
64. The record underscores the Pikula court's opinion. 374 N.W.2d at 713.
See supra note 66 (quote from Pikula). Except for cases premised on saving
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cilitate appellate review by insisting on highly particularized
trial court findings of fact.6s
The Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed concern with
the ineffectiveness of such appellate review.6 The court's fear
is that applications of the best interest standard might reflect
the individual beliefs of the decisionmaker rather than the best
interests of the child.67 This presents a particular hazard: If
the child's relationship with a primary caretaker, Minnesota's appellate courts
have never reversed or even remanded an original child custody decision dur-
ing the era of gender neutral decisionmaking, beginning in 1969. See 1969 stat-
utory amendment, supra note 23. The volume of such appeals is unknown for
the years 1969 through 1983, when the state's intermediate court of appeals
was formed. Between 1983 and 1985, however, when Picula was decided, the
court of appeals had approximately twelve appeals per year from original cus-
tody decisions.
65. A line of supreme court cases mandates highly particularized trial
court fact finding, expressly prescribed to "facilitate appellate review of the
family court's custody decision." Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 311 Minn. 76, 81-83,
249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1976) (among other reasons for the mandate, particular-
ized findings were expected to compel consideration of statutory factors and to
satisfy the parties that the trial court's decision was fairly rendered). See
Note, supra note 18, at 1376 (confidence that findings mandate produces effec-
tive appellate review, without caretaker preference).
66. See Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713 (citations omitted).
The inherent imprecision heretofore present in our custody law has,
in turn, diminished meaningful appellate review. We have repeatedly
stressed the need for effective appellate review of family court deci-
sions in our cases, and have required specificity in written findings
based on the statutory factors. We are no less concerned that the
legal conclusions reached on the basis of those findings be subject to
effective review. We recognize the inherent difficulty of principled
decisionmaking in this area of the law. Legal rules governing custody
awards have generally incorporated evaluations of parental fitness re-
plete with ad hoc judgments on the beliefs, lifestyles, and perceived
credibility of the proposed custodian. It is in these circumstances that
the need for effective appellate review is most necessary to ensure
fairness to the parties and to maintain the legitimacy of judicial
decisionmaking.
Id. See also Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 16, at 203 (presumptive standard
may provide, "possibly for the first time," a basis for "meaningful appellate re-
view of trial court awards"); O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 530-33 (reviewing merit
of caretaker preference in permitting effective review).
67. Chambers, supra note 43, at 481-85, 568 (open standard produces deci-
sions often "arbitrary or overreaching"); Charlow, supra, note 53, at 267-70
(standard "more a vague platitude" than a legal standard, a "euphemism for
unbridled judicial discretion," a legal rule inviting decision by "guesswork");
Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 16, at 202 (absent presumptive rule, standard on
best interests is "abstract and valueless"); Elster, supra note 53, at 28-32 (lit-
any of prospective distortions of best interests standard); Glendon, Fixed Rules
and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L.
REV. 1165, 1169 (1986) (multi-factor standard produces arbitrary outcomes, in-
coherent governing principles); Mnookin, supra note 8, at 229, 257-61, 263
(standard produces "indeterminate and speculative" results, wholly dependent
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personal values are the measuring device for custody decisions,
fault inevitably becomes a determinative factor, and the child
custody decision focuses on parental conduct rather than the
best interests of the child.
In addition, few decisions involve greater judicial authority
than the choice of a child's custody.68 Critics express concern
that the current system grants too much discretion to judges
who already have the awesome power to decide a child's cus-
tody. Added to this concern is an awareness that error in a cus-
tody decision impacts immensely on the lives of parents,
children and the community.
Efforts have been proposed for many years to diminish liti-
gation in divorce cases.69 The high correlation between broad
on individual decisionmaker); Sharp, Modification of Agreement-Based Cus-
tody Decrees: Unitary or Dual Standard?, 68 VA. L. REV. 1263, 1289 (1982) (ju-
dicial custody decisions, because they are unreliable under general standard,
entitled to less finality than stipulated results); Uviller, supra note 43, at 124
(best interests standard "high-tone and well-intended" but "devoid of sub-
stance" and open to all childrearing prejudices); Wexler, supra note 53, at 779-
80 (noting criticism of best interests standard as "resulting in an indetermi-
nacy perhaps unparalleled in any other area of the law"); see also Perkins v.
Courson, 219 Ga. 611, 628, 135 S.E.2d 388, 399 (1964) (Duckworth, C.J., dissent-
ing) (child's best interests are as definable as the expression "'as long as a
rope' "). In the words of one Minneapolis judge, responding to a survey on the
issue: "Either legislatively or judicially, some simplicity should be returned to
the child rearing question, not to mention the entire family law field."
Surveys of Minnesota Lawyers [hereinafter Minnesota Surveys], conducted in
October and November 1989 by this author (on file with Minnesota Law Re-
view), called for a response of marked choices, see infra notes 106, 108 and 135,
but responses included numerous volunteered statements.
68. See supra note 62 (discussing role of judges). Rarely has the issue
been addressed more concisely and clearly than by Dean Pound, 53 years ago:
Child placement involves administrative authority over one of the
most intimate and cherished of human relations. The powers of the
Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile
courts and courts of domestic relations. The latter may bring about a
revolution as easily as did the former. It is well known that too often
the placing of a child in a home or even in an institution is done casu-
ally or perfunctorily or even arbitrarily. Moreover effective preven-
tive work through these courts requires looking into much more than
the bad external conditions of a household, such as poverty or neglect
or lack of discipline. Internal conditions, a complex of habits, atti-
tudes, and reactions, may have to be dealt with and this means admin-
istrative treatment of the most intimate affairs of life. Even with the
most superior personnel, these tribunals call for legal checks.
R. Pound, Foreword to P. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATmENT IN PROBATION AND DE-
LINQUENCY at XXVH (1937). See also Lowery, Child Survey of Judges, 12
PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 492 (1981) (personal standards employed by judges in de-
ciding custody issues); Pearson & Ring, supra note 8, at 716-22 (same); Reidy,
Silver & Carlson, supra note 53, at 78-80, 83-86 (same).
69. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRiAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 102(3), 9A U.L.A. 149, 158
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uncertain custody standards and increased divorce litigation has
intensified the search for certainty.70 Critics of the best inter-
est standard argue that a more definite rule will provide less in-
centive for parents to go to court to resolve child custody
disputes. The West Virginia and Minnesota Supreme Courts
both considered this issue and determined that a need for cer-
tainty should predominate over competing concerns.7 ' The
Minnesota Supreme Court, in fact, predicted that the primary
caretaker preference would largely remove custody issues from
the arena of dissolution disputes.72
A desire to reduce custody litigation arises from a concern
for the adjudication burden on the courts and the cost and pain
of litigation to the parties.73 For the courts, control of litigation
(1973) (uniform legislation aimed at promoting amicable dispute settlements
between marriage partners and voluntary provisions for custody).
70. See Chambers, supra note 43, at 562 (effect of certain rule in discour-
aging litigation is clear, signalling to the parents the probable outcome); Char-
low, supra note 53, at 270, 273 (uncertain standard encourages litigation);
Cochran, supra note 18, at 17-20, 61 (increased litigation with imprecise stan-
dard); Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257, 265 (1974) (analysis of effects of uncertain rules on parties as
well as decisionmakers showing a positive correlation of certainty with settle-
ment, and less expensive proceedings); Fineman, supra note 43, at 772 (precise
test reduces litigation); Glendon, supra note 67, at 1179-82 (best interests stan-
dard gives "maximum incentive" for litigation); Mnookin, supra note 8, at 284
(although predictable rules reduce litigation, they may have detrimental effect
of changing the spouses' bargaining power in private negotiations); Mnookin &
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (reviewing laws as framework for settlement); Scott &
Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 469 (uncertain standard encourages litigation).
71. See infra notes 73-74, 81, 82, 84 (discussing West Virginia and Minne-
sota cases); see also Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 625 (N.D. 1986) (Le-
vine, J., dissenting); In re Maxwell, 8 Ohio App. 3d 302, 304-05, 456 N.E.2d
1218, 1221 (1982) (recitation of language of Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357,
360-61 (W. Va. 1981)); David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 915 (W. Va.
1989).
72. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713.
73. See David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 915, 919 (W. Va. 1989)
(trauma for all litigation participants); R. NEELY, supra note 8, at 73-77, 81 (de-
ploring cost and observing uselessness of expensive expert testimony in litiga-
tion under imprecise standard); Elster, supra note 53, at 22-26 (reviewing cost
of deciding cases with imprecise standard for decisionmakers, parents, and
children); Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 16, at 202 (literature shows judges
find role in custody cases "onerous and frustrating"); Mnookin & Kornbauser,
supra note 70, at 956, 972 (settlement avoids parental cost and pain); Pearson
& Ring, supra note 8, at 722 (judicial dislike for domestic relations cases); Wat-
son, supra note 62, at 62-64 (litigation harm, borne especially by children, also
taxing on finances and emotions of parents); see also Note, Parental Custody of
Minor Children, 5 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 223, 227 (1974) (burden for deci-
sionmaker includes pain and regret felt upon interference with parent-child
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is critical. The Garska court observed that, without substantial
settlements, "the understaffed judiciary would topple like a
house of cards."74 For families, custody litigation results in tre-
mendous emotional and financial harm for all participants.
The welfare of children is a special concern.75 Many studies
show that parental conflict, which intensifies with the delay
and stress of litigation, harms a child's adjustment and develop-
ment.76 Worsening the problem, other studies indicate a corre-
relationship) (quoting State ez rel. Paine v. Paine, 23 Tenn. 513, 523, 4 Hum.
523, 533 (1843)).
74. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981).
75. See H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAw CASES, ComENTs, AND QUESTIONs 711
(2d ed. 1983) (reprinting 1982 N.Y. Times report regarding fight of a pair of
California condors over their egg, ending in accidental destruction of the egg);
O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 523 (quoting trial court observation reported in a
1972 Oregon appellate decision: "The chances of a child developing emotional
problems as they grow up increases in direct proportion to the thickness of the
file involved in a divorce case") (quoting King v. King, 10 Or. App. 324, 328,
500 P.2d 267, 268 (1972)); see also R. NEELY, supra note 8, at 66, 77-79 (risk that
litigation will "destroy" the child); Elster, supra note 53, at 24 (citing social
and medical reports that show child bears largest cost in litigation); Mnookin
& Kornhauser, supra note 70, at 956-58 (negotiated settlement diminishes
damage to child's relationship with each parent and is more credible than judi-
cial decisions); Uviller, supra note 43, at 126 ("[v]itriolic and extended court
battle may be worse for the child than custody with the 'less desirable' par-
ent"); Watson, supra note 62, at 63-64, 71-72 (prolongation of proceedings dev-
astating for child therefore finality an important consideration in child custody
decisionmaking); Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation
in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126,
1129-34 (1978) (noting twin dangers of litigation process and prolonged uncer-
tainty). Responding to a survey, an active Minnesota family law practitioner
observed that, given the inevitability of litigation in some dysfunctional rela-
tionships, the primary need is to try cases "as quickly as possible" and to "keep
children out of the middle" of the proceedings. Minnesota Surveys, supra note
67. But cf Fulton, Parental Reports of Children's Post-Divorce Adjustment, 35
J. Soc. ISSUES 126, 131-32 (1979) (parents report stress of children resulting
from divorce, but deny long term problems in relationship resulting from cus-
tody contest); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 475-76, 495 n.100 (noting ex-
perts who deemphasize importance of parental conflict and suggesting that
tighter standard, if perceived by one spouse as unfair, also enlarges parental
conflict).
76. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUm & A. SoLNrr, supra note 3, at 37-38, 50, 113-33
(consequential suffering of children supports a premise for severe limitation
on modification of visitation proceedings); Chambers, supra note 43, at 503-41
(review of research on needs of children in divorce, downplaying relative harm
of "bad" custody choice); Charlow, supra note 53, at 275, 280-83 (reviewing so-
cial and medical research on correlation between control of conflict and later
child development); McDermott, Divorce and Its Psychiatric Sequelae in Chil-
dren, 23 ARcHcvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 421, 426 (1970) (dangers of negative ex-
ample by parents in conflict, and hazard of hostilities turned directly on child);
Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 490-92 & n.190, 494-96 (evidence that contin-
uing parental conflict more damaging than divorce itself or loss of contact with
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lation between litigation and relitigation, thus extending the
child's agony through the course of repeated judicial reviews of
the custody decision.77
Although commentators generally emphasize the child's in-
terest in controlling courtroom disputes, mothers also benefit
from decreased litigation. Courts78 and other observers79 have
found that mothers are more frequently the primary parent
and are more often the party with fewer resources for a court-
room proceeding. Thus, although the caretaker standard is
facially gender-neutral, by promoting less litigation, it actually
favors mothers. Some observers praise this result, reasoning
that the caretaker preference is necessary to avoid gender
one parent); Johnston, Ongoing Post-Divorce Conflict in Families Contesting
Custody: Does Joint Custody and Frequent Access Help?, (paper presented at
meeting of American Orthopsychiatric Association, March 30, 1988) (high inci-
dence of emotional and behavioral problems tied to severe parental conflict or
prolonged conflict associated with permanent shared child custody
arrangements).
77. Berger, Madakasira & Roebuck, Child Custody and Relitigation,
Trends in a Rural Setting, 58 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 604 (1988) (study of
884 child custody cases in which only 10 of the 171 relitigated cases followed
original agreement on custody); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 493 (custody
issues often relitigated); Watson, supra note 62, at 63, 80 (threat of continued
litigation causes custodial parent to be defensive and ultimately harms child);
Wexler, supra note 53, at 758, 802 (more trials on modification than on original
awards and suggesting need for more study on tendency of initial litigation to
promote relitigation).
78. The Garska court acknowledged that the primary caretaker in most
cases is still the mother. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W. Va. 1981).
In David M., the West Virginia court noted, citing studies, "Shared responsi-
bility for child care would seem more a cosmopolitan pretension than a reality
in most settings." David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 917 (W. Va. 1989).
The court added that application of the Garska factors "usually, but not neces-
sarily, spells 'mother'." Id. at 923 (citations omitted).
79. Several commentators agree with the West Virginia court. See R.
NEELY, supra note 8, at 15, 60-62 (reviewing literature on mother care); Cham-
bers, supra note 43, at 534 (even working mothers spend more time with chil-
dren than fathers); Fineman, supra note 43, at 769 n.166, 772-73 (vast majority
of working women are primary parents); Mason, supra note 59, at 25 n.117 (cit-
ing literature showing that working women perform more child care functions
than fathers); O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 540 (primary caretaker preference
beneficial for mothers although justifications for preference are gender neu-
tral); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 460-61, 483 (reviewing evidence that
mothers commonly are primary caretakers, even if they work); Uviller, supra
note 43, at 111-12, 117-23, 130 (feminist support for gender neutrality gives way
to preference favoring mothers, after taking into account unjust economic cir-
cumstances of women and hazard of gender neutral custody standard for poor,
disadvantaged women). A Minnesota family court referee observed, late in
1989: "We see very few house-husband cases anymore." Minnesota Surveys,
supra note 67.
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abuse under the general best interests standardsa
Increased opportunities for litigation also increase the risk
that the non-caretaker parent will use the threat of litigation to
compel costly concessions by primary parents who lack the eco-
nomic means or personal strength to defend their claims."'
Both courts82 and scholarsan have found that one party will
threaten the other with litigation even when the familial cir-
cumstances strongly show that the child's closer parental rela-
tionship should be preserved. The primary parent, because of
preoccupation with needs of the family home, is especially vul-
nerable to such intimidation. This parent often cannot afford
litigation expenses and must be concerned with meeting future
economic needs.84 Thus, a primary parent who lacks the means
80. Uviller, supra note 43, at 130.
81. The strategic threat of litigation "cannot in any sense be viewed as in
the best interests of the children involved." Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705,
712 (Minn. 1985) (citing Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 70). The West
Virginia court warns that litigation may wound or destroy children. Garska,
278 S.E.2d at 361; David M., 385 S.E.2d at 920-21.
82. "Parents already estranged may be tempted to use a threatened cus-
tody contest strategically when neither parent can predict with any certainty
which parent will ultimately be awarded custody." Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712.
"[WMhen the uncertainty in the outcome of a trial is necessarily high," the
threat of custody litigation may be used to reduce the child support obligation
or determine other issues in the case. Id. at 713. Similarly, the Garska court
observed, "[o]ur experience instructs us that uncertainty about the outcome of
custody disputes leads to the irresistible temptation to trade the custody of the
child in return for lower alimony and child support payments." 278 S.E.2d at
360. The court labels this phenomenon the "Solomon syndrome." Id. at 362.
See R. NEELY, supra note 8, at 62-64 (West Virginia chief justice observes "sin-
ister" bargaining approaches under imprecise custody standard); O'Kelly,
supra note 18, at 521-22 (reviewing Garska rationale); see also In re Marriage
of Welby, 89 Or. App. 412, 415-17, 749 P.2d 602, 603-05 (1988) (Rossman, J., dis-
senting) (calling for more openness in modification of consent decrees and re-
porting familiarity with improper custody decisions due to unequal bargaining
positions).
83. See Cochran, supra note 18, at 15-17, 61 (imprecise standard creates
bargaining problem detrimental to mothers and children); Glendon, supra
note 67, at 1170, 1180-81 (incentive for dispute under vague custody standard);
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 70, at 950, 978 (discussing previous forma-
tion of divorce law as framework for bargaining and noting enhanced bargain-
ing power of fathers under gender neutral custody law); Scott & Derdeyn,
supra note 8, at 465 & n.44, 468 & nn.56-57 (fathers have incentive under best
interest standard to demand custody).
84. The Pikula court saw both sides to the vulnerability of the primary
parent. First, the primary parent has greater need for economic support if he
or she has "remained at home throughout a marriage to raise the children"
and has "sacrificed economic and educational opportunities in order to per-
form that role." Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712-13. Second, "in practical fact, many
primary caretakers may simply be unable to afford the expense of litigation at
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to bargain8 5 might make unwarranted concessions on financial
issues to avoid costly litigation.8s This parent might also make
concessions on custody or visitation rights, thereby risking the
child's welfare and safety. 7 In states that defer to original pa-
rental agreements, the risk of such concessions is especially
great because the concessions might be irreversible.8 8 The esca-
lating cost of legal services, 9 along with the potential for reliti-
gation and complex trials, exacerbates this problem.
C. COMPATIBILITY WITH GENDER NEUTRALITY AND THE
MULTIPLE INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Proponents of the primary caretaker preference assert
that, in addition to protecting strong parent-child bonds and
discouraging litigation, the preference preserves gender neu-
trality and the general best interests of the child. They stress
all." Id. at 713. The West Virginia court also made these observations, and ad-
ded repeatedly that the threatened loss of custody is "particularly terrifying"
to the primary parent. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360-62 (W. Va. 1981);
see also David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 915, 917-24 (W. Va. 1989)
(mothers especially willing to sacrifice excessively to preserve their ties with
children); In re Maxwell, 8 Ohio App. 3d 302, 304-06, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1221-22
(1982) (employing Garska language).
85. R. NEELY, supra note 8, at 64-65 (relative financial disabilities of
mothers); Chambers, supra note 43, at 499-503, 541-49 (prospect of trauma for
primary caretaker in loss of custody); Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 70,
at 971, 978-80 (uncertain standard harms position of mother, who is most "risk-
averse"); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 478 (primary caretaker most
prone to make concessions to save child custody).
86. R. NEELY, supra note 8, at 62-73, 80 (hazard of concessions upon threat
of litigation); Meyer & Schlissel, Child Custody Following Divorce: How
Grasp the Nettle?, 1982 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 496, 497 (uncertain custody standard
changes settlement of other issues).
87. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 477-81, 496-97 (litigation risks un-
wanted joint custody concessions); see also Mnookin & Korntauser, supra note
70, at 980-84 (implications of tie between visitation and likelihood of
settlement).
88. See, e.g., Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Minn. 1989) (deferring
to original agreement for permanent waiver of maintenance); see also
Mnookin, supra note 8, at 288 (reasons for judicial deference to parental settle-
ments); Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 70, at 958, 994-96 (theoretical and
practical problems in control of bargaining by scrutiny of agreements); cf.
Meyer & Schlissel, supra note 86, at 499-501 & n.12 (stating obligation for scru-
tiny upon request for ratification of agreement).
89. Meyer v. Meyer, 441 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (stating
imperative need for reform due to escalation of legal costs); R. NEELY, supra
note 8, at 66 (hazard of costly proceedings); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at
468 (extraordinary "application costs" in custody litigation). A local Minnesota
family bar group, in an unsolicited response to a survey on child custody law,
reported that "the escalating costs of divorce are pricing custody litigation out
of reach for most parents." Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67.
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that the standard is facially neutral and permits fathers to
change their parenting patterns to establish themselves as pro-
spective custodial parents.90 Moreover, some commentators ar-
gue that the benefits of the preference in terms of decreased
litigation outweigh any deterrent effect the standard might
have on fathers who wish to seek custody.91 Three courts have
found the caretaker preference gender neutral,92 but others
have found it no different then the discarded tender years
doctrine.93
Supporters of the preference also defend it against claims
that such a presumption impermissibly sacrifices qualitative
decisionmaking. Few proponents assert that the preference
preserves all of the child's best interests.9 The Minnesota
Supreme Court, however, found the standard compatible with
child welfare concerns, even in the face of numerous interests
90. See supra note 23-24 and accompanying text (gender neutral law de-
velopment); Charlow, supra note 53, at 274 (primary caretaker preference gen-
der neutral, unlike tender years doctrine); Fineman, supra note 43, at 773
(primary caretaker preference gender neutral "on its face"); O'Kelly, supra
note 18, at 495-99, 537-42 (caretaker preference gender neutral contrasted with
tender years doctrine, which involves gender bias of constitutional
significance).
91. See Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 16, at 203 (deterring litigation
through use of the presumptive standard outweighs the disadvantage of dis-
couraging fathers who wish to seek custody).
92. All three courts faced legislative mandates for gender neutrality, but
none elaborated on the concept. The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that
either parent may be the primary parent and that the standard might promote
co-parenting. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 712 n.2 (Minn. 1985). Some-
what similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court observed: "INlow that sex
roles are becoming more flexible and high-income jobs are opening to women,
it is conceivable that the primary caretaker may also be the father." Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W. Va. 1981). In 1980, the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals rejected as apparent error a trial court opinion that preference for the
mother as primary caretaker violated the mandate for gender neutrality. Van
Dyke v. Van Dyke, 48 Or. App. 965, 969, 618 P.2d 465, 466 (1980).
93. Cunningham v. Cunningham, No. 1281 (Ohio App. Nov. 17, 1986)
(LEXIS, States Library, Ohio file) (Grey, J., dissenting) (favors restoring cus-
tody with mother consistent with the tender years presumption, now "couched
in modern day jargon of 'primary care giver' "); Haag v. Haag, 336 Pa. Super.
491, 498, 485 A.2d 1189, 1192 (1984) (primary caretaker standard "a sort of
tender years doctrine in disguise"); supra note 33 (instances of Ohio deference
to primary caretaker show repeated emphasis on legitimacy of tender years of
child as a consideration). See also State ez reL Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc.2d 178,
350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 290-91 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (reviewing constitutional dimen-
sion of objections to tender years doctrine).
94. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (observations on tie be-
tween primary parenting and vital bonded relationship); cf. Mnookin, supra
note 8, at 282-87 (caretaking standard omits qualitative considerations and uses
indefensible prediction of future care).
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
identified in the state's multi-factor custody statute.9 5 The
court emphasized the importance of the child's bond to a pri-
mary parent and reasoned that four of the nine statutory best
interests factors were central to primary caretaking.9 It found
the remaining factors "inherently resistant of evaluation and
difficult to apply." Critics have directly questioned the court's
reconciliation between the statutory factors and the primary
caretaker relationship.9 8 Nevertheless, a majority of the court
still asserts that "the golden thread running through any best
interests analysis is the importance, for a young child in partic-
ular, of its bond with the primary parent as this relationship
bears on the other criteria."
III. FLAWS AND FAILURES OF THE CARETAKER
PREFERENCE IN MINNESOTA
In almost every aspect of its rationale, the primary care-
taker preference proved ineffective in Minnesota, and other
states show evidence of similar difficulties. The failure is prin-
cipally the result of the lack of a usable definition of primary
caretaking, which is necessary to achieve any of the standard's
asserted benefits. This section documents the increase in litiga-
tion in Minnesota following adoption of the caretaker standard
and discusses the factors that led to this unexpected
development.
A. UNIMPEDED PATTERNS OF LITIGATION
The primary caretaker preference, contrary to the expecta-
tions of its supporters, caused an explosion of litigation in Min-
nesota. Two family law commentators observed that Pikula
"spawned an incredible amount of litigation concerning who
changed more diapers, the unfitness of parents and the thresh-
95. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711-12 n.1 (Minn. 1985).
96. The court premised its view on the four statutory best interests factors
central to primary caretaking: (1) the child's relationships with others, (2) ad-
justment to home and community, (3) length of time in a satisfactory place-
ment, and (4) permanence of family unity. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 711 n.1. See
MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 1 (c), (d), (e), (f) (1988), discussed supra note 24.
97. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712. Even when custody evaluations occur, they
may not adequately furnish needed insight for decisions. Id. See infra note
199 (concession that interests sacrificed by caretaker preference); see also
supra notes 62, 67-68 (best interests decisions unpredictable, factors un-
measurable); infra notes 123, 201-02 (best interests considerations
unmeasurable).
98. See Note, supra note 18, at 1359-68; infra note 203.
99. Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. 1990).
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old age at which a child is old enough to express a prefer-
ence."1 ° This comment must be read in perspective, with the
knowledge that the vast majority of custody placements are
still made pursuant to parental agreements, and most place-
ments, including children of all ages, are made with the chil-
dren's mothers. 10 ' Nevertheless, further scrutiny of the facts
confirms such observations of increased litigation in the state
following adoption of the primary caretaker standard.
Appellate court records demonstrate this rise in litigation.
In 1984, before the Pikula decision, the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals decided nine original custody decisions.' 0 2 For each of the
years 1986 through 1988, however, the court decided an average
of thirty such cases.' 0 3 Trial court records also provide evi-
dence of an increase in litigation. Although these records are
for divorce litigation generally and do not classify cases accord-
100. Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 22
FAM. L.Q. 367, 460 (1989). See Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705.
101. As one Twin Cities judge volunteers, "very few families litigate cus-
tody." Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67. Thus, this judge concludes that
most of the time litigation is avoided under both precise and imprecise stan-
dards. Id. See Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 16, at 202 (reciting historic esti-
mate that custody is placed with child's mother in 90% of cases, including
contested matters); Fulton, supra note 75, at 128 (in study of over 400 cases,
sole custody with mother in 87%, with father in 8%); Scott & Derdeyn, supra
note 8, at 468 n.58 (evidence that mothers obtain custody in 90% of cases and
enjoy personal preference of decisionmakers); see also Rettig, Yellowthunder,
Christensen & Dahl, Economic Consequences of Divorce for Men, Women, and
Children in Minnesota: A Preliminary Report 2-3 (available from U. of Minn.
Dept. of Family Social Science, 1985 Buford Ave., St. Paul, MN 55108). Among
1153 Minnesota cases studied in 1986, only 24 of which went to trial, mothers
received sole custody in 81% of the cases, while fathers received custody in
10%. AeL These researchers reported elsewhere that mothers received custody
in only 12 of the 24 tried cases, and fathers in eight cases, meaning that cus-
tody was placed with the mother in 81.7% of settled cases. MNNESOTA
SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE CoURTS, FINAL
REPORT 24 (1989) (available from Minnesota Supreme Court Information Of-
fice, St. Paul, MN) [hereinafter GENDER REPORT]. Notwithstanding this evi-
dence, there is ample room for doubt whether the number of consent
placements with mothers corresponds with the high incidence of mothers fur-
nishing primary care for children. See supra notes 78-79.
102. See Ebnet v. Ebnet, 347 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Chambard
v. Chambard, 348 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Pikula v. Pikula, 349
N.W.2d 322 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Heard v. Heard, 353 N.W.2d 157 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984); Flinck v. Flinck, 351 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Kotfla v.
Kotila, 351 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Morey v. Peppin, 353 N.W.2d 179
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Stangel v. Stangel, 355 N.W.2d 489 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); Schultz v. Schultz, 358 N.W.2d 136 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
103. Although no formal state recordkeeping system classifies court of ap-
peals cases according to subject matter, a comprehensive Westlaw search re-
vealed an average of 30 original custody cases in the years 1986-1988.
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ing to the issues involved, they do show an increase in divorce
litigation since 1984.104 Other sources provide a mixed picture
of the volume of custody trial activity in Minnesota during the
late 1980s.105
Because of the imprecision of state trial court records and
the difficulty of precisely measuring settlement trends, the au-
thor surveyed Minnesota's trial judges and active family law
practitioners to obtain more information about the impact of
the primary caretaker standard on child custody litigation. The
survey asked the respondents to evaluate the effectiveness of
the primary caretaker preference in avoiding litigation and the
threat of litigation.106 Table 1-1 shows the responses of 121 at-
104. Records of the Minnesota State Court Administrator show 799 Minne-
sota divorce trials for 1984, and an average of 891 in the four succeeding years.
The 1988 volume, however, was 815 - only 2% higher than 1984. These
figures include trials on post-judgment motions. Filings of divorce appeals fol-
low a similar pattern, 279 cases (13% of volume) in 1985, and an average of 358
cases (16% of volume) in subsequent years.
105. See Rettig, Yellowthunder, Christenson & Dahl, supra note 101, at 2.
These researchers found 6117 cases involving child custody, comprising 42.4%
of all Minnesota divorce cases in 1986. A more detailed study of 1153 of these
custody cases showed that 2.1% were tried. Id. Projecting Minnesota's experi-
ence to the nation, based solely on population, one might estimate that some
7500 custody cases are tried annually, from among over 350,000 cases involving
children. This trial figure is about 10% of a popularized recitation of some
75,000 custody "disputes" each year, a figure used in a Chicago Tribune colum-
nist's report in September 1989. The portion of Minnesota divorces involving
children, 42.5%, contrasts with various national estimates of up to 75% of all
cases. See Fulton, supra note 75, at 126 (children involved in one half to three-
quarters of recent divorces); Glendon, supra note 67, at 1172-73 (estimating
that children involved in nearly 60% of divorces); Glick, Children of Divorced
Parents in Demographic Perspective, 35 J. Soc. IssuEs 170, 174 (1979) (census
official reports children involved in close to 60% of divorces in each of the
years between 1960 and 1978).
106. The survey questionnaire and the responses are on file with the au-
thor. The author directed the survey to 162 active participants in the Family
Law Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association. Seventy-five percent, or
121 attorneys, responded.
The form asked the lawyers to respond to a number of questions,
including-
In Pikula, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded. 'The rule we
fashion today should largely remove the issue of custody from the
arena of dispute over such matters, and prevent the custody determi-
nation from being used in an abusive way to affect the level of sup-
port payments and the outcome of other issues in the proceeding."
Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Minn. 1985). Some feel the
preference worked for primary parents, leading not only to settle-
ment of cases but to settlements placing custody with the primary
parent. On the other hand, custody litigation has been unabated; it
has been observed that the standard induced competing claims of
caretaking; and appellate cases indicate many judges had serious diffi-
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torneys, seventy-five percent of those surveyed. Fifty-four per-
cent of the respondents found the standard rarely or only
sometimes effective, and slightly more than one-half also
agreed that the standard induced contests on identification of
the primary caretaker.1° '
culties identifying a primary caretaker. In your experience, how well
did ttle preference serve to induce settlements shaped by a clear rec-
ognition of the correct custody award, favoring the "primary parent?"
Check the observation you think most accurate:
a. Preference clearly spared primary parents unnecessary
litigation.
b. Litigation was avoided most of the time.
c. Sometimes the standard produced settlements as expected.
d. Rarely did the preference avoid litigation among parents.
Some say the standard frequently backfired, inducing claims, espe-
cially by fathers, that they did a worthy and equal service in caretak-
ing. Do you think this is true?
a. Yes
b. No
Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67. Regrettably, the definition of the issue
tends to be suggestive by including the conclusion from other evidence that
custody litigation had not abated. Arguably, the danger of suggestion is offset
by the sophistication of the persons surveyed and the range of choice permit-
ted in the response.
107. A group of Minnesota lawyers volunteered that "those people who
were intent on fighting were not dissuaded, their focus merely shifted to dem-
onstrating either ambiguity in the caretaking roles or unfitness on the primary
caretaker's part." Id. "To be blunt," one family law specialist noted,
"although well-intended, Picula was a disaster in practice. It resulted in more
trials and more appeals than under the former or present standards." Id.
Also, this lawyer added-
Trial courts become so focused on counting diaper changes, even at
temporary hearings, that the kids get lost along the way. Thus, the
hearings and trials get longer, dirtier. There are reams of paper in af-
fidavits where parents exaggerated facts in order to win custody. Al-
ready bulging family court filing spaces overflowed.
I& On the issue of strategic threats of litigation, this lawyer stated.
Many "primary parents" were blackmailed into accepting joint cus-
tody, even where it was inappropriate, because the ought-to-be-custo-
dial parent did not have the financial and/or emotional resources to
engage in a full trial. This was particularly true where that parent
was the victim of psychological abuse during the marriage and would
do anything to escape the abuser. Interestingly, many of these "joint
custody" cases are back before the court because they are unworkable




Effectiveness of Primary Caretaker Standard in
Reducing Litigation - Responses of
Attorneys
Number Percent
a. Clearly effective 11 9%
b. Effective "most" cases 45 37%
c. Effective "some" cases 50 41%
d. Effective "rarely" 15 13%
Total 121 100%
Total, c. - d. 65 54%
Standard frequently induced litigation 62 51%
Table 1-2 shows the responses of attorneys who devoted
more than one-half of their practice to family law. This group
found the preference even less effective in promoting settle-
ments. Fifty-eight percent responded that the standard was
rarely or sometimes effective and fifty-nine percent responded
that it frequently induced litigation.
TABLE 1-2
Effectiveness of Primary Caretaker Standard in
Reducing Litigation - Responses of Active
Family Law Practitioners
Attorneys Whose Practice
is More Than 50% in
Family Law
Number Percent
a. Clearly effective 7 8%
b. Effective "most" cases 28 34%
c. Effective "some" cases 40 48%
d. Effective "rarely" 8 10%
Total 83 100%
Total, c. - d. 48 58%
Standard frequently induced litigation 49 59%
Table 2-1 shows the responses of 151 trial court judges.108
Thirty-seven percent of the judges found the standard was
108. In addition to surveying practicing attorneys, the author surveyed all
Minnesota trial judges, including full time Twin Cities family court referees.
Sixty-two percent, or 151 judges, responded. Nineteen of those who did not re-
spond declined because of their lack of experience with the issue.
This survey listed the "backfire" effect of the preference as one of five
measures of its effectiveness. C. Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67.
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rarely effective or was counterproductive. An additional thirty-
eight percent of the respondents found the standard only some-
times effective.1°9 Table 2-2 then breaks down the responses of
trial court judges between judges in the Twin Cities metropoli-
tan area and those outside this area. The breakdown shows
that the former group, who practice in Minnesota's two largest
counties, were especially critical of the standard's effectiveness.
Sixty percent of the judges in the Twin Cities described the
preference as rarely or sometimes effective, and twenty percent
described it as counterproductive. Outside the metropolitan
area, fifty-four percent of the judges responded that the stan-
dard was rarely or sometimes effective, and sixteen percent re-
sponded that it was counterproductive.
TABLE 2-1
Effectiveness of Primary Caretaker Standard in
Reducing Litigation - Responses of Trial
Judges
Number Percent
a. Clearly effective 4 3%
b. Effective "most" cases 29 22%
c. Effective "some" cases 50 38%
d. Effective "rarely" 26 19%
e. Adverse effect, inducing claims 24 18%
Total 133 100%
Total, c. - e. 100 75%
TABLE 2-2
Effectiveness of Primary Caretaker Standard in
Reducing Litigation - Assessment by
Twin Cities Judges Versus Other
Judges
Twin Cities Judges Other Judges
Number Percent Number Percent
a. Clearly effective 1 1% 3 5%
b. Effective "most" cases 13 19% 16 25%
c. Effective "some" cases 27 39% 23 37%
d. Effective "rarely" 15 21% 11 17%
e. Adverse effect, inducing claims 14 20% 10 16%
Total 70 100% 63 100%
Total, c. - e. 56 80% 44 70%
109. A Twin Cities judge, finding the preference rarely effective, suggested
it "simply changes the terminology, not the essence of the dispute." Id.
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Finally, Table 2-3 shows the responses of Minnesota judges
who heard the most family law cases. These judges, who pre-
sumably have the greatest knowledge of custody litigation out
of all the groups surveyed, were the most critical of the stan-
dard's effectiveness. Thirty-seven percent of the judges whose
caseload was at least seventy-five percent comprised of family
law matters found the standard counterproductive. Fifty per-
cent of those judges found the standard was somewhat or rarely
effective. Similarly, of the judges whose caseload included at
least fifty percent family law matters, thirty-two percent de-
scribed the preference as counterproductive. Fifty-two percent
described it as somewhat or rarely effective.
TABLE 2-3
Effectiveness of Primary Caretaker Standard in
Reducing Litigation - Responses of Active
Family Law Judges
Family Law Family Law
Assignments Assignments
75% or More* 50% or More**
Number Percent Number Percent
a. Clearly effective 0 0% 0 0%
b. Effective "most" cases 2 13% 5 16%
c. Effective "some" cases 6 37% 11 36%
d. Effective "rarely" 2 13% 5 16%
e. Adverse effect, inducing claims 6 37% 10 32%
Total 16 100% 31 100%
Total, c. - e. 14 87% 26 84%
* These judges spent more than 75% of their working time in family law
matters during at least one year since 1985, when the primary caretaker
standard was adopted.
** These judges spent more than 50% of their working time in family law
matters during at least one year since 1985.
The observations that the preference did not effectively re-
duce litigation are especially significant because they refer to a
period when additional developments were believed to discour-
age contests. Such developments include the preference for
joint custody, the use of mediation for dispute resolution, and
the skyrocketing cost of litigation.110 On the other hand, the
110. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 2 (1988) (rebuttable presumption upon
request of at least one party for joint legal custody); MINN. STAT. § 518.619
(1988) (mandatory statewide mediation program for custody cases); see also
supra notes 73-74, 89 (custody litigation costs).
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increase in litigation cannot be completely attributed to flaws
in the primary caretaker standard. Parents might desire to
contest custody for a variety of reasons, such as the hostility of
a divorce, the vulnerability felt from loss of the marriage, and
the pressure imposed by some attorneys." Furthermore, be-
cause divorce laws do little to mitigate the strong wish of an in-
jured husband or wife to punish an unfaithful spouse, a parent
might litigate custody as a substitute means of imposing punish-
ment and seeking justice." Finally, parties will inevitably pur-
sue litigation to test the limits of a newly announced standard.
Thus, evidence of increased litigation should be evaluated
with a view toward all possible sources of the development.
Nevertheless, the increase in Minnesota is significant. It differs
from results reported in West Virginia, where Justice Neely
stated that the preference there "reduced the volume of domes-
tic litigation over children enormously."' 13 The West Virginia
report, lacking substantiating evidence, is questionable in light
of Minnesota's experience. The question remains, however,
why the primary caretaker preference failed to meet the opti-
mistic goals of the Minnesota Supreme Courtn 4 and other sup-
porters of the standard.1-5 The following observations provide
111. Changing social conditions are altering the vitality of these factors.
Three influences are commonly identified: (1) hostility of separating parents;
(2) defensiveness of parent threatened with loss of marriage, parenting, eco-
nomic security, or self-respect; and (3) the interest of some lawyers in litiga-
tion. See supra notes 82-83 (use of custody claim as strategy for other gain);
see also R. NEELY, supra note 8, at 85 (fathers motivated by perception that
losses are punishment); Bishop, When Custody is Not the Issue, 1989 FAm. Ai.
voc. 14 (Summer 1989) (custody pursued to show dedication to child, or to
marriage, to gain advantage on other issues); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at
492-93 (review on factor of "hostility and sadness" of separating spouses);
Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and
the Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 739, 757
(1983) (parents' and children's emotional states and interaction upon marital
separation may be a response to divorce crisis and are not indicative of future
relationships).
112. Commenting for a Twin Cities newspaper, one active family law prac-
titioner observed, "[n]o-fault divorce took away from spouses the option of du-
eling head-on over each other's misdeeds. Now, if your husband leaves you for
another woman, what do you do? You don't let him see the kids." Minneapo-
lis Star Tribune, Feb. 18, 1990, at 15A, col. 1. See infra notes 224-26 (sense of
injustice as source of opposition to caretaker preference).
113. R. NEELY, supra note 8, at 83. See Glendon, supra note 67, at 1182 (ob-
serving Justice Neely's report and concluding that West Virginia has "gone
far" in eliminating the strategic threat of custody litigation).
114. See supra note 72 (projection of Pikcula court).
115. Chambers, supra note 43, at 561-64 (a strong version of the caretaker




B. AN IMPRECISE DEFINITION OF CARETAKING
Imprecision of the broad best interests standard, according
to proponents of a primary caretaker preference, contributes to
litigation and the threat of litigation.116 This criticism, how-
ever, overlooks the question of whether the preference itself is
imprecise.1 17 To counteract the alleged vagueness of the best
interests standard, a higher level of exactness is necessary in
defining "primary caretaking."
Few observers, judges or scholars, suggest that the "Garska
factors"" 8 are a perfect measure of the child's more vital par-
ent-child relationship." 9 In fact, some directly question the
suitability of the factors.120 Undoubtedly, the volume of care is
tion); c f. Crippen & Hatling, supra note 22, at 418 (finding it "conceivable, per-
imps even predictable" that disputes will occur on proof of primary parent
status and become "a new avenue of hostile litigation in dissolution cases").
116. See supra notes 70-89 and accompanying text.
117. See Mason, supra note 59, at 25 (employment of both parents makes
identity of primary caretaker unclear). Some Minnesota practitioners volun-
teered criticism on the general vagueness of the primary caretaker preference
declared in Pikula. An experienced judge found that the standard had limited
success as a "rule" because it may be "avoided, evaded, excepted or otherwise
gotten around." Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67. A family court referee
found that "vagueness" of the standard amplified the vagueness of the entire
topic of the child's best interests. An active family law attorney observed that
the preference permitted some argument for almost all caring parents. Id.
118. See supra text accompanying note 45; see also supra note 46 (omission
of Oregon reference to "close and successful emotional relationship").
119. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711-12 n.2 (Minn. 1985) (preference
recognizes the importance of the bond formed between the primary caretaker
and the child); Berndt v. Berndt, 292 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 1980) (intimate rela-
tionship "assumed" after suitable care and affection given for three and one-
half years); Patzer v. Glaser, 396 N.W.2d 740, 743 (N.D. 1986) (psychological
parent relationship develops from daily care); In re Maxwell, 8 Ohio App. 3d
302, 304, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1221 (1982) (choice to protect "the close and success-
ful emotional relationship between the primary parent and the children");
David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 916 (W. Va. 1989) (observes that
young children "form a unique bond with their primary caretaker"); Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 364 (W. Va. 1981) (equates primary caretaking with the
giving of "love, affection, concern, tolerance, and the willingness to sacrifice");
cf. supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (preference viewed as an out-
growth of the bonded relationship concept); Chambers, supra note 43, at 528-
29 (tie between caretaking and attachment to parent); Fineman, supra note 43,
at 771 (preference "assumes" bonding accompanies physical care); O'Kelly,
supra note 18, at 509-17, 528 ("tangible nurturing" normally leads to psycho-
logical bonding).
120. The Minnesota State Bar Association Family Law Section asserted in
an amicus brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1988 that:
While time spent on these tasks [the Garska-Pikula factors] may very
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not always indicative of quality parenting.121 Activities in the
presence of the child are likely to be more valuable than tasks,
such as washing clothes, that are done for the child.ma
Recognizing these shortcomings, supporters of the primary
caretaker preference emphasize the advantage of the precise-
ness of the standard.m They assert that an examination of
caretaking involves a somewhat easy look at concrete behav-
ior, 2 4 in contrast to the almost futile task of identifying the
loosely defined best interests of the child. Thus, proponents of
the caretaker preference intended it to substitute simplicity
and certainty for a more thorough evaluation of the child cus-
tody issue. Evidence, however, shows that this expectation has
not been achieved and that, in practice, application of the pref-
erence involved substantial uncertainty.
The initial evidence of complications and uncertainty ap-
pears in Minnesota's high level of custody litigation. 25 This
trial activity is at least partially due to an indeterminate defini-
tion of primary caretaking. Also, because the Garska factors,
which include preparing meals, giving baths and washing
clothes, focus on past parental conduct, they invite acrimonious
conflict and leave room for the type of litigation that usually
accompanies vague standards. Some courts worsen the problem
likely contribute to bonding between a parent and his or her child, no
empirical evidence has been presented to support the proposition that,
in and of themselves, these factors alone produce the intimate bond
between parent and child.
Brief for Amicus Curiae Minnesota State Bar Association Family Law Section
at 10, Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1988) (No. CX-87-403). See
also infra note 202 (criticism of tie between physical care and bonding).
121. Elster, supra note 53, at 38; Mnookin, supra note 8, at 284.
122. Elster, supra note 53, at 37-38; Chambers supra note 43, at 538.
123. See David M., 385 S.E.2d at 925 (stating an aim that, if fit, the primary
caretaker parent of very young children will have no chance of losing cus-
tody); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNrr & S. GoLDsTEIN, supra note 43, at
66-67 (West Virginia primary caretaker guidelines give explicit identity to
child custody factors); O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 529 (standard on quantity of
care "objective, easily applicable, functional"); supra notes 62-89 and accompa-
nying text (concern for certainty); supra note 95; infra notes 201-02, 208, 213
(disregard of immeasurable factors); infra note 199 (choice of certainty over
conflicting interests).
124. See David M., 385 S.E.2d at 924 (anticipating that primary caretaker
can be quickly designated in most cases); see also Fineman, supra note 43, at
772 (because courts traditionally adjudicate on past events, past caretaking role
is one "judges can comfortably apply," and is predictable for lawyers and par-
ents); O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 524 (primary caretaking can be easily identi-
fied and therefore provides a workable judicial standard). But see Mnookin,
supra note 8, at 284-85 (caretaking standards difficult to apply).
125. See supra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
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by emphasizing the importance of past actions. They view care-
taking not in terms of a relationship, but as evidence of a pro-
pensity to furnish future care.128 Others encourage still more
contention by citing the need to reward past caretaking.'2=
Understandably, studies of past parenting behavior include
evaluation of the character of the caregiver and the quality of
care, not just the quantity of care. The investigation of parental
care patterns, aimed at identifying concrete actions, often pro-
duces self-serving claims intended to establish that one party is
the more caring, giving and sacrificial parent. As in litigation of
the child's wide-ranging best interests, the actual inquiry tends
to focus on identifying the "best" parent. Thus, inquiry into
past patterns of behavior often produces bitter disputes,1 28
along with the distorted claims, accusations and denials that are
common in divorce conflicts.129
In addition, evaluations of parental roles inevitably intro-
duce distortions based on gender stereotyping. Stereotyping of
family relationships commonly favors mothers. In fact, the
caretaker preference is often described as a presumption for
mothers. 3 0 A recent Minnesota task force report identified
126. See Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. 421, 426,
448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1982) (concern for predicting future commitment); Garska
v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 364 (W. Va. 1981) (prediction of future care can best
be based on past course of conduct). Contending the preference "makes
sense," one Minnesota trial judge characterized as a "practical observation"
that "those who bear major custodial responsibilities before marital break-up
are most likely to continue to do so, therefore best care for, young children
after divorce." Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67.
127. See Elster, supra note 53, at 17-18, 30; Fineman, supra note 43, at 771
(reward for mother's sacrifice appropriate).
128. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 468 (custody litigation "seems
designed to promote acrimony" between parents where standard permits
probe on character and lifestyle of parties). A local bar group in Minnesota
volunteered the observation that litigation on past experiences of parents is
"generally negative, increasing their hostility toward one another." Minnesota
Surveys, supra at 67.
129. See Fulton, supra note 75, at 129-31 (analysis of parents constructing
overbroad views of their contribution to child care); Mnookin, supra note 8, at
284-85 (caretaking standard invites exaggeration and dishonesty in litigation);
supra note 107 ("reams" of affidavits containing "exaggerated facts"); see also
Novotny v. Novotny, 394 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that
unfitness exception to preference prompted exchange of accusations at trial).
130. Gender stereotyping encompasses assumptions that mothers are more
able custodial parents. See O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 499 n.87 (surveys on bias
for mothers); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 468-69 (pattern of custody
placements with mothers); supra notes 62, 68 (personal values employed by
judges); supra notes 78-79 (caretaker preference viewed as presumption for
mothers); infra note 222 (standards intimidate fathers).
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such gender biases.131 On the other hand, as the task force re-
port also stated,132 application of the preference often results in
the celebration of caretaking contributions of fathers and the
criticism of shortcomings of mothers.1a3 The nature of the pri-
131. GENDER REPORT, stupnm note 101. The report analyzed a sampling of
responses from Minnesota's registered attorneys and found that-
[Sixty-nine percent] of the state's male lawyers and 40% of the female
lawyers think that judges always or often seem to assume that chil-
dren belong with their mother. Ninety-four percent of the male at-
torneys and 84% of the female attorneys think that judges make this
assumption at least some of the time ....
Id. at 23. Many lawyers pointed.out the dangers of oversimplification in this
area; judicial reluctance to award fathers custody is not always the result of
stereotypical thinking.
I tend to discourage fathers from seeking physical custody because
they seldom are successful. Generally, they are not successful because
their motivations are poor - ie., seek custody to spite wife, not for
best interests of children. (Male attorney, suburban.)
I believe that it is very difficult for a man to obtain custody, but I be-
lieve this is due to the fact that, in this culture, men traditionally do
much less of the caretaking during the marriage, even if the woman
works outside the home. When I do an initial interview with men in a
custody case, I am amazed with their lack of involvement with and
knowledge of their children's day-to-day needs. Most of these men
love their children and are well-intentioned, but they don't have the
background to pursue custody .... So I don't perceive this as "gender
bias," but as reality. Why would a judge take children away from a
person who has been providing day to day care of the children? (Fe-
male attorney, Twin Cities.)
Id. at 24.
132. See GENDER REPORT, suprm note 101, at 24. The Minnesota task force
included this anecdotal evidence on stereotyping harmful to women:
A male family law practitioner wrote, for example, that in his experi-
ence the most flagrant examples of gender bias in Minnesota's courts
involve "certain male judges who believe it is inappropriate for custo-
dial mothers to pursue a career."
In [another] category of cases judges sometimes overestimate the father's
parenting contributions. A respondent to the lawyers' survey observed that:
"Fathers seem to get more weight given to their direct care activities than do
mothers. Mothers may do 90-95% of the actual caretaking, but if father does
anything at all then he often gets credit for more than his 5-10%." (Male at-
torney, Greater Minnesota.) Id Participants in the Twin Cities lawyers' meet-
ing described it as giving fathers extra "parenting points" for doing things like
changing the baby's diapers or putting the children to bed. Several people ob-
served that this tendency to exaggerate the father's involvement may be due
to the fact that in our culture women are still expected to care for children
and men are not. Id. at 24-25.
133. Mason, supra note 59, at 25-26 (special credit given to fathers for day-
time childcare activity); O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 519-21 (novelty of father
care leads to overstatement of significance; corresponding criticism of mothers
not exclusively preoccupied with child care; North Dakota and Kansas case il-
lustrations); Polikoff, supra note 18, at 239-41 (contrasting view toward "dedi-
cated" father and "half" mother); Uviller, supra note 43, at 108-09, 130
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
mary parent examination, involving a study of multiple factors,
provides almost all parents with some credible basis for exag-
gerating the significance of their efforts.134 Thus, parents who
before the adoption of the primary caretaker preference would
not have attempted to contest custody might now consider what
factors they could apply or formulate to claim custody.
The high levels of litigation in Minnesota suggest the exist-
ence in the state of the above-described deficiencies in the pri-
mary caretaker definition. To inquire further into these
definitional flaws, however, judges and attorneys were sur-
veyed on their observations of whether conflicts under the
standard became "fault-based," or characterized by an exchange
of claims on virtue and fault.135 The inquiry has two purposes:
it provides some indication of whether the caretaker definition
invites contentious posturing, and it suggests whether the stan-
dard promotes an inquiry that focuses predominantly on justice
for parents rather than the interests of children.13
(feminist goal of discarding material preference before women have made sub-
stantial headway in nondomestic area may put women at a disadvantage in
custody disputes because of women's inferior earning capacity and an enduring
social bias against working mothers); see also infra note 162 (prevalence of
successful fathers in litigated cases); cf. supra note 101 (overall success of
mothers).
134. A family law specialist, commenting on the impact of the caretaking
preference, reported that "some parents who would never have thought of
contesting custody in the other parent began to consider what factors they
could apply" to claim custody. Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67. In Minne-
sota, the scope of inquiry was enlarged by the uncertainty of whether the Gar-
ska factors were exclusive. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Minn.
1985) (opinion silent on exclusivity of factors); Regenscheid v. Regenscheid,
395 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (strong emotional bond equalizes
physical care by other parent); Sheeran v. Sheeran, 401 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (following Regenscheid).
135. The pertinent question was posed to both groups in this form:
3. Minnesota decided on no-fault dissolution in 1978. Child custody
was to be decided solely in terms of the child's best interests. In
Pikula, it was emphasized it serves the child to protect stable rela-
tionships. However, the primary caretaking "factors" seem to invite
weighing the virtues of good caretaking and the fault connected with
gaps in caretaking. As litigation on the primary caretaker occurred,
how prevalent was the problem of a fault-based conflict, an exchange
of claims of virtue and fault? Circle the degree of the problem from 0
(not at all fault-based) to 5 (completely fault-based) as you observed
it:
012345
Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67. Here, also, the question may tend to be
suggestive, a problem inherent in defining the issue addressed. See supra note
106 (comment on suggestiveness and offsetting considerations).
136. Charlow, supra note 53, at 270-72 (reviewing literature on parent in-
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Table 3-1 shows the responses of 121 attorneys who actively
practice family law in Minnesota. Fifty-nine percent assessed
the prevalence of fault-based conflict at a level of three or
greater on a scale of zero to five, with five indicating complete
fault-based conflict. Thirty-three percent chose a score of four
or five. Table 3-2 presents the responses of Minnesota attor-
neys whose practice was more than fifty percent comprised of
family law matters. Sixty-two percent of these attorneys de-
scribed the prevalence of fault-based conflict at a level of three
or greater. Forty percent indicated a score of four or five.
TABLE 3-1
Tendency Under Primary Caretaker Standard to
Focus on Claims of Parent Fault and
Virtue - Responses of Family
Law Practitioners
Number Percent





5 (Completely fault-based) 10 8%
Total 121* 100%
Total, 3 - 5 71 59%
Total, 4 - 5 40 33%
* Of the 162 active participants in the Family Law Section of the Minnesota
State Bar Association, 121, or 75%, responded.
terest factors that tend to be most determinative in court adjudications). See
In re Marriage of Ertmann, 376 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (stating
that proper focus for custody determination should not be solely on past
parenting behavior but on the long-range best interests of the child). Purists
on this issue may forget that parent behavior is not irrelevant to the child's
future interests, and parent interests are not a wholly illegitimate factor in de-
ciding a custody placement. See Elster, supra note 53, at 16-21, 28-32; see also
inra notes 193-94 (distinguishing this child welfare concern, one appropriately
considered by proponents of the preference, from criticism that decisions
under the standard overlook significant interests of children and fathers).
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TABLE 3-2
Tendency Under Primary Caretaker Standard to
Focus on Claims of Parent Fault and
Virtue - Responses of Active
Family Law Practitioners
Lawyers Whose Practice
is more than 50M in
Family Law
Number Percent





5 (Completely fault-based) 9 10%
Total 87 100%
Total, 3 - 5 54 62%
Total, 4 - 5 35 40%
Table 3-3 breaks down the responses of attorneys on
whether conflicts under the standard are fault-based into two
groups: attorneys who found the standard effective in reducing
litigation, and those who found it had limited effectiveness.
The Table shows a correlation between attorneys who de-
scribed the caretaker preference as somewhat or largely inef-
fective in discouraging litigation, and those who strongly
assessed the presence of the fault factor. Eighty percent of
those who found the standard at most sometimes effective also
highly assessed the prevalence of a fault-based conflict under
the standard; almost fifty percent indicated a score of four or
five. Among those attorneys who found the standard effective
and who were thus less likely to witness custody disputes, rela-










Total, 3 - 5





























* These attorneys observed that the primary caretaker standard reduced
settlement without litigation only rarely or sometimes, or even induced
litigation. See Table 1-1.
** These attorneys observed that the primary caretaker standard clearly
reduced litigation or did so most of the time. See Table 1-1.
Tables 4-1 through 4-4 show responses of 151 trial court
judges to the same issue. Table 4-1 shows that seventy percent
of all judges surveyed assessed the prevalence of fault-based
conflict with a score of three or greater. Thirty-eight percent
chose a score of four or five. Table 4-2 separates the total re-
sponses between judges from the Twin Cities metropolitan area
and those outside this area. The results show that Twin Cities
judges, who practice in Minnesota's two largest counties, per-
ceived a greater amount of fault-based conflict. Seventy-four
percent of judges from the Twin Cities ranked the amount of
fault-based conflict at a level of three or greater. Fifty percent
of these judges indicated a score of four or five.
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TABLE 3-3
Tendency Under Primary Caretaker Standard to
Focus on
Claims of Parent Fault and
Virtue - Correlation with
Attorneys' Responses on Effectiveness of Primary
Caretaker Standard in Reducing Litigation
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
TABLE 4-1
Assessment by Trial Judges - Tendency Under
Primary Caretaker Standard to Dwell on









Total, 3 - 5





















* The survey encompassed all Minnesota trial judges, including full time Twin
Citites family court referees, although many do not hear dissolution cases.
Sixty-two percent, or 151 judges, responded. Nineteen of those who did not
respond chose to do so because of their lack of experience with the issue.
TABLE 4-2
Tendency Under Primary Caretaker Standard to
Focus on Claims of Parent Fault and









Total, 3 - 5





















Table 4-3 shows the responses of Minnesota judges who
heard the most family law cases. These judges indicated the
highest amount of fault-based conflict of all the groups sur-
veyed. Eighty-one percent of the judges whose caseload was at
least seventy-five percent comprised of family law cases as-
sessed the prevalence of fault-based claims at a level of three to
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five. Sixty-nine percent of this group chose a score of four or
five. Of the judges whose caseload was at least fifty percent
comprised of family law matters, seventy-seven percent indi-
cated a score of three or greater and forty-five percent chose a
score of four or five.
TABLE 4-3
Tendency Under Primary Caretaker Standard to
Focus on Claims of Parent Fault and









Total, 3 - 5
Total, 4 - 5
Family Law
Assignments
























* These judges spent more than 75% of their working time in family law
matters during at least one year since 1985, when the primary caretaker
standard was adopted.
** These judges spent more than 50% of their working time in family law
matters during at least one year since 1985.
Finally, Table 4-4 divides the responses of judges as to
whether conflicts under the standard are fault-based between
judges who found the standard effective in reducing litigation
and those who found it had limited effectiveness. The table
shows a correlation between judges who described the care-
taker preference as somewhat or largely ineffective in discour-
aging litigation and those who strongly assessed the presence of
a fault factor. The correlation, however, was not as strong as




Tendency Under Primary Caretaker Standard
to Focus on Claims of Parent Fault and
Virtue - Correlation with
Judges' Responses on
Effectiveness of Primary Caretaker
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* These judges observed that the primary caretaker standard reduced
litigation only rarely or sometimes, or induced litigation. See Table 2-1.
** These judges observed that the primary caretaker standard clearly reduced
litigation or did so most of the time. See Table 2-1.
C. BROAD INTERPRETATIONS OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE
CARETAKER PREFERENCE
In addition to the imprecise definition of caretaking, sev-
eral exceptions to the primary caretaker preference have con-
tributed to increased litigation. Although some litigation
invariably accompanies the initial refinement of exceptions to
any rule, in Minnesota enlargements to and vague definitions of
the exceptions led to excessive disputes. As the exceptions
were expanded, the preference was narrowed, thus allowing
more litigation under the broad best interests standard. These
developments also promoted the use of threats of litigation as a
bargaining strategy. 37
The primary caretaker preference has three express excep-
137. See supra notes 82-89 (hazard of strategic threats under best interests
standard); cf Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 477-79, 497 (analysis of precise
rule with regard to bargaining consequences).
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tions and leaves room for two more. The preference is ex-
pressly inapplicable to older children,1ss to an unfit parent' 39
and to parents who are equal caretakers.140 Furthermore,
although the stated subject of the preference is care before sep-
aration, an exception has developed in practice for temporary
caretaking following the separation.14 Finally, an exception to
the preference could arise in favor of joint physical custody
arrangements.142
Evolution of the primary caretaker standard in Minnesota
led to enlargements and vague definitions of these exceptions.
138. Garska called for the preference in placing children of tender years,
but permitted deference to the opinions of older children. Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981). In 1989, the court made a more precise dec-
laration that trial courts could give weight to actual preferences of children
over age five. David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 924 (1989). See discus-
sion inj'fa notes 147-48. The Minnesota Supreme Court confined the rule to
cases of children "too young to express a preference," leaving unclear the need
for an actual expression of the child's opinion. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713.
139. The West Virginia court first described the condition of fitness as a
"minimum, objective standard" of behavior. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362-63. Ex-
plaining this concept, the court cited a definition from an earlier decision:
"[Wihere the primary caretaker fails to provide: emotional support; routine
cleanliness; or nourishing food." I& at 362 n.9. Eight years later, the court
further clarified its standard:
To be a fit parent, a person must: (1) feed and clothe the child appro-
priately; (2) adequately supervise the child and protect him or her
from harm; (3) provide habitable housing, (4) avoid extreme disci-
pline, child abuse, and other similar vices; and (5) refrain from im-
moral behavior under circumstances that would affect the child.
David M., 385 S.E.2d at 914.
140. The Garslca court prescribed the preference for cases where one par-
ent is "clearly" the primary caretaker. Garka, 278 S.E.2d at 363. Somewhat
inconsistently, the court confined the shared parenting exception to cases in
which care was shared in an "entirely equal way." Id. The Pikula court called
for no such clear picture of primary care, and adopted confinement of the ex-
ception to cases where care was shared in an "entirely equal way." Pikula, 374
N.W.2d at 713-14. The Minnesota court added: "We would expect that, as be-
tween any two parents, one will be the primary parent even if neither con-
forms to the more traditional pattern of one parent working outside the house
and one within it." Id.
141. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 714 (care when "the family relationships were
physically disrupted by events leading to the dissolution of the marriage");
Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363 (care "before the domestic strife giving rise to the
proceeding began"). This determination can be subsequently altered by prac-
tice and by formal recognition of an exception for long-term post-separation
placement. See infra note 153.
142. When announcing a firm preference, neither the West Virginia nor
the Minnesota court spoke of claims for joint physical custody. The two opin-
ions, however, speak unequivocally about an award of custody to one parent -
the primary caretaker. See Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713-14; Garska, 278 S.E.2d at
363.
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This section examines these developments and especially com-
pares them to developments in West Virginia, the only other
state with a stated primary caretaker preference. The compari-
son illustrates the contrasting response of appellate courts in
West Virginia, where the supreme court has frequently cor-
rected loose application of the preference, 143 and in Minnesota,
where no such corrections have occurred.144 It suggests the de-
velopment of broad exceptions to the preference in Minnesota
and comparatively ineffective appellate review by Minnesota
courts, an issue more thoroughly discussed in the following
section.
Initially, the exception to the preference for older children
greatly minimizes the standard's potential impact.145 The ra-
tionale for this exception is presumably that the placement
wishes of children old enough to express a preference should
receive deference. Several commentators, however, have criti-
cized this reasoning, arguing for abolition of the exception or
restriction of its application to older children.146 Conversely,
143. See infra note 161 (reversals of trial court findings on equal caretak-
ing). In West Virginia, announcement of the standard began with a reversal.
See Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 364. There, the court reversed placement of a one-
year-old with the father, based on the conclusion that the mother was primary
caretaker. Because the standard was newly announced, the trial court had
made no finding regarding the primary caretaker. In subsequent years, the
West Virginia Supreme Court reversed trial court findings that the father was
the primary caretaker. See, e.g., Wagoner v. Wagoner, 310 S.E.2d 204, 206 (W.
Va. 1983) (per curiam) (custody awarded to working mother on finding of four
significant evidentiary items: (1) mother's attention given to child when both
parents present, (2) father's use of babysitter when at home, (3) observation of
father's primary role in upkeep of home, and (4) admission that mother spent
most time with children); cf infra notes 145-50 (mixed message on exception
for child's choice); notes 153-55 (broadening of exception for temporary loss of
custody).
144. See supra note 134 (broadening of caretaking factors); infra notes 147,
152, 161, 165-66 (expansion of exceptions); infra notes 177-78 (application not
reversed).
145. CY. Polikoff, supra note 18, at 235 (age of seven frequently cited as
ceiling for tender years doctrine); Reidy, Silver & Carlson, supra note 53, at
78-79, 83-85 (in practice judges give little attention to wishes of child at age
five, and moderate attention even at age ten).
146. One Twin Cities family law specialist volunteered support for the
caretaker preference, but asked, "what do we do about children aged 5-18?"
Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67. See Chambers, supra note 43, at 532 (evi-
dence supporting continuity of care of children as late as age 10); Cochran,
supra note 18, at 62 (suggesting caretaker preference application to all con-
tested custody cases); Fineman, supra note 43, at 771-72 (same). Fineman rea-
sons as follows:
I believe that limiting the rule to children under the age of seven un-
realistically assumes that nurturing ends when a child begins school.
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Minnesota expanded the exception beyond its rationale by ap-
plying it to all children over seven years old, whether or not
they actually expressed a placement choice. 147 In West Vir-
ginia, where the exception covers only express preferences, 14s
the appellate court has further suggested that a child's prefer-
ence should control only when the child is thirteen years or
older. The West Virginia court, however, once set aside the
preference based on a six-year-old's placement desire, which
was evidently detected without reference to any declaration.14 9
Except for West Virginia, no state has defined the age beyond
which a child's preference will displace the caretaker standard,
This limitation would also send the message that if a parent fails to
nurture during a child's early years, he need not worry, because there
will be no negative consequences with respect to later custody
determinations.
ICE
147. See Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 712. See supra note 41 (employing phrase
"too young to express a preference" as a condition of the primary caretaker
preference); Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 212 (Minn. 1988) (Pikula anal-
ysis inapplicable because eight-year-old child is old enough to express a prefer-
ene). But cf. Roehrdanz v. Roehrdanz, 410 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(primary caretaker preference employed for placement of children ages 6, 10,
and 12 even where there was evidence of express preference); Imdieke v. Im-
dieke, 411 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing placement pre-
ferred by 12-year-old, although premised on avoiding a split of siblings).
148. See David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 924 (W. Va. 1989). The
David M. court suggested infrequent solicitation of the preference of children
ages six through thirteen:
In exceptional cases when the trial judge is unsure about the wisdom
of awarding the children to the primary caretaker, he or she may ask
the children for their preference and accord that preference whatever
weight he or she deems appropriate. Such an interview, because of
the problems in asking children about their parental preference,
should not, however, be routine and neither party may demand such
an interview as a matter of right.... The judge is not, however, re-
quired to hear the testimony of the children, and will usually not do
so, particularly if he or she suspects bribery or undue influence.
Nonetheless, by allowing the children to be acceptable experts in our
courts, an escape valve is provided in unusually hard cases.
I& at 924. See also S.H. v. R.L.H., 169 W. Va. 550, 552-53, 289 S.E.2d 186, 188-90
(1982) (affirming change of custody from primary caretaker mother to father,
based on preferences of children ages 11, 13, and 14).
149. Graham v. Graham, 326 S.E.2d 189, 191 (W. Va. 1984) (per curiam) (af-
firming joint custody of six-year-old child with father based on equal caretak-
ing by parents); see also Michael R. v. Sandra E., 378 S.E.2d 840, 842-43 (W. Va.
1989) (per curiam) (reviewing denial of change from divided custody to place-
ment with non-primary parent; reversal premised on preference of 10-year-old
and primary parent drug abuse and "erratic" behavior); cf. Rose v. Rose, 340
S.E.2d 176, 180 (W. Va. 1985) (McGraw, J., dissenting) (contending vigorously




thereby leaving the potential for litigation.1s°
A second significant exception to the standard is for tempo-
rary placements created shortly before or after separation of
the parents.1 5 ' This exception has developed through case law
in both Minnesota 5 2 and West Virginia.1 3 Trial judges cite the
desire to avoid disturbing the continuity of any care arrange-
150. See supra note 148 (West Virginia clarifies standard in 1989); Terdan
v. Terdan, No. C7-90-62 (Minn. Ct. App. July 25, 1990) (LEXIS, States library,
Minn file) (if maturity and expression properly assessed, choice of seven-year-
old child may be determinative); Mowers v. Mowers, 406 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (preferences of seven-year-old children defeat caretaker prefer-
ence); Petersen v. Petersen, 394 N.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); cf.
Speltz v. Speltz, 386 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (children ages six
and four too young to express preference therefore caretaker preference
prevails).
151. It is evident that the primary parent preference, as implemented to
date, has not eliminated this competing preference or the bargaining abuse
that accompanies it. One Minnesota trial judge volunteered the opinion that
appellate court uncertainty on this issue significantly explains the continued
pattern of custody litigation after adoption of the caretaker preference. Min-
nesota Surveys, supra note 67.
152. See McCabe v. McCabe, 430 N.W.2d 870, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (up-
holding father as primary caretaker based on care for 17-month period begin-
ning five or six months before separation, notwithstanding the caring role of
mother during that period); Gorz v. Gorz, 428 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (upholding father as primary caretaker although mother cared for chil-
dren until six or seven months before separation); Sucher v. Sucher, 416
N.W.2d 182, 184-85 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming placement of children
with father who shared care during year before couple separated although
mother was primary parent for preceding six years); Heim v. Heim, 394
N.W.2d 254, 255 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming father as primary caretaker
even though mother was primary caretaker until shortly before separation).
But of Roerhdanz v. Roerhdanz, 410 N.W.2d 359, 361-62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(rejecting plea of father that he cared for children during year before
separation).
153. See J.E.I. v. L.M.I., 314 S.E.2d 67, 73 (W. Va. 1984) (affirming place-
ment with father who provided care for two-year-old for six months after sep-
aration); Dempsey v. Dempsey, 306 S.E.2d 230, 231 (W. Va. 1983) (per curiam)
(affirming son's placement with father who had custody for eleven months
before trial although mother was primary parent for seven years); see also In
re Marriage of Maddox, 56 Or. App. 345, 348, 641 P.2d 665, 667 (1982) (af-
firming father's custody premised on his significant contribution to caretaking
for eight months between separation and trial); Brooks v. Brooks, 319 Pa.
Super. 268, 274-77, 466 A.2d 152, 156-57 (1983) (stating that primary caretaking
is only one factor to be assessed at the time of hearing); Gallagher v. Adkins,
No. 87-342-II (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Ten file)
(affirming custody to father premised on his care for 10 months pending mo-
tion proceedings); Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988) (father's care
of three-year-old during one year pendency of case establishes him as primary
caretaker); Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (establish-




ment, including a short term placement.Ma Defenders of the
primary caretaker standard acknowledge the need for an ex-
ception for longstanding custodial relationships,155 but allege
that expansion of the exception risks the greater use of tempo-
rary custody as a threat in both the bargaining process and in
actual contests.156 Considering the already widespread recogni-
tion and use of the "foot in the door" advantage of temporary
arrangements, however, confinement of the exception to long
term placements appears unlikely.
A third exception to the preference is for situations in
which both parents are equal caretakers.157 Both the West Vir-
ginia and Minnesota Supreme Courts have stated that the ex-
ception only applies when the parents shared caretaking duties
in an "entirely equal way."'-, Despite this narrow language,
however, Minnesota courts have broadly construed the excep-
tion to produce strained findings of equal caretaking. Minne-
sota appellate courts affirmed trial court findings of equal
caretaking in at least twelve cases.159 Several other state courts
have also interpreted the exception expansively.160 Only West
154. See CHAMBERS, supra note 43, at 533-38 (observing active parenting
role of secondary parent at progressive stages of child development); O'Kelly,
supra note 18, at 543 (noting disadvantages of strict regard to care before sepam-
ration); Pearson & Ring, supra note 8, at 720 (struggle of younger judges to
avoid changing temporary custody arrangement).
155. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 212 (Minn. 1988) (care after separa-
tion defeats preference for earlier caretaker where trial not reasonably close
to separation date); Sinsabaugh v. Heinerscheid, 428 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (applying Seficow rationale for three-year litigation period); Grimm
v. Grimm, No. C3-88-1600 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1989) (LEXIS, States li-
brary, Minn file) (similar application, 26-month delay period).
156. Adding to the breadth of this issue, according to volunteered com-
ments of a Twin Cities family law specialist, is the easy access of parents to
domestic abuse proceedings, and the use of these actions "to remove a custody
competitor prior to commencement of the divorce action." Minnesota Surveys,
supra note 67.
157. Application of the equal parenting exception involves a variation on
the problem of how to define primary caretaking. See supra notes 128-36 and
accompanying text (difficulties in evaluating caretaking evidence). The equal
parenting exception is the most likely focus for advocates or decisionmakers
who doubt the evidence of a primary caretaking pattern. If the preference is
to be compromised, this is the most natural device to employ.
158. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 714 (Minn. 1985); Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981); Note, suprm note 18, at 1359 (regards excep-
tion of Pikula as one requiring finding of "exactly" equal caretaking).
159. See infra notes 165-66.
160. Arkansas: Riddle v. Riddle, 28 Ark. App. 344, 346 S.W.2d 513, 515
(1989) (although no state precedent on caretaking factor, court affirms place-
ment with father based on closer bond and recites his active caretaking role).
Ohio: See supra notes 30-31 (ample precedent in Ohio to disregard pri-
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Virginia, where the supreme court has reversed three trial
court findings of equal caretaking, has made an effort to limit
the scope of the exception.161 Casting some suspicion over lib-
eral findings of equal caretaking, observers generally did not
anticipate this expansive application of the exception; they be-
lieved that equal caretaking would be a rare circumstance. 62
mary caretaking); Summers-Horton v. Horton, No. 88AP-622 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 30, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (without rejecting contention
that the mother was the primary caretaker, court affirms trial court finding
that both parents have "excellent interaction and interrelationship" with their
children and affirms placement of children with father); see also Michel v.
Michel, No. 6-87-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio
file) (affirming placement of children with father where employed mother was
the primary caregiver but father substantially assisted).
Oregon: See supra note 39 (in the midst of three reversals favoring pri-
mary caretakers between 1977 and 1983, factor simply disregarded in 1980 deci-
sion); In re Marriage of Maddox, 56 Or. App. 345, 347-48, 641 P.2d 665, 667
(1982) (affirming custody of father for two children where homemaker mother
was the primary caretaker based on a significant amount of time father de-
voted to the children).
Pennsylvania: See supra note 27 (primary caretaking one factor or per-
haps a substantial factor); Haag v. Haag, 336 Pa. Super. 491, 498-99, 485 A.2d
1189, 1193 (1984) (finding working mother's claim of primary caretaking un-
proven where evidence shows both parents were involved in caretaking).
Utah: Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (court
ordered split custody, ignoring mother's primary caretaking role and empha-
sizing that father spent equal time caretaking "when -he was in the home")
(emphasis omitted).
Vermont: Peckham v. Peckham, 149 Vt. 388, 389, 543 A.2d 267, 268 (1988)
(among many factors entitled to weight, including mother's primary caretak-
ing, is evidence that father actively participated in the child's care).
161. There are no Minnesota cases to parallel three decisions of the West
Virginia Supreme Court that reversed trial court findings on equal caretaking.
In Lounsbury v. Lounsbury, 296 S.E.2d 686, 688-89 (W. Va. 1982) (per curiam),
the trial court found that neither parent had "clearly taken primary responsi-
bility for the caring and nurturing duties." The appellate court reversed, find-
ing it "obvious" that the mother was the primary caretaker. That conclusion
was briefly explained by reference to an admitted high level of physical care-
taking by the mother. Id. See also Isaacs v. Isaacs, 358 S.E.2d 833, 835 (W. Va.
1987) (per curiam) (reversing finding that neither parent was primary care-
taker premised in part on trial court's wrongful use of evidence on mother's
sexual conduct); Gibson v. Gibson, 304 S.E.2d 336, 338-39 (W. Va. 1983) (per
curiam) (concluding that the evidence clearly shows that the mother was the
primary caretaker even though both parents worked); cf. Graham v. Graham,
326 S.E.2d 189, 191 (W. Va. 1984) (per curiam) (affirming equal caretaking);
J.E.I. v. L.M.I., 314 S.E.2d 67, 72 (W. Va. 1984) (same); Dempsey v. Dempsey,
306 S.E.2d 230, 231 (W. Va. 1983) (same).
162. A finding of equal parenting is typically a finding that the mother is
not the primary caretaker. Because observers believe this situation is so rare,
any significant number of findings of an equal care arrangement are suspi-
cious. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 714 (Minn. 1985) (confidence in
preference even where both parents employed); Polikoff, supra note 18, at 237
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Furthermore, true equal caretakers are probably the least
likely persons to litigate custody, principally due to the strong
interests of both parents in joint custody.1 63
Commentators have observed that mothers who work
outside the home are most vulnerable to this exception because
a primary caretaker is more difficult to identify when both par-
ents work.164 However, although Minnesota appellate courts
often applied the exception when a mother worked outside the
home, 65 they were equally likely to make a finding of equal
(evidence that fathers winning custody have not been exceptionally involved
in child care); Uviller, supra note 43, at 129 (weighing the prospective strength
and weakness of a maternal preference and concluding that the only exception
should be for primary caretaker father); supra note 124 and accompanying
text (expectations that identification of primary caretaker is easy task). Simi-
larly, commentators have viewed with suspicion the more general pattern that
mothers fare poorly in contested cases. Under the imprecise best interests
standard, observers have found that custody was placed with the mother in
only one-third of contested cases. Polikoff, supra note 18, at 236-37 (summary
of data); Note, supra note 18, at 1373 n.142. In Minnesota, under Pileula,
mothers fared only somewhat better, getting custody in half of tried cases.
Rettig, Yellowthunder, Christensen & Dahl, supra note 101 (study of 1153
cases decided in 1986).
163. Fineman, supra note 43, at 773; Polikoff, supra note 18, at 242.
164. See In re Marriage of Shepherd, 588 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979) (en banc) (observing that mother who works gives no more care than fa-
ther); Elster, supra note 53, at 37-38, 40 (contending primary caretaking find-
ing genuinely difficult where both parents work); Minnesota Surveys, supra
note 67 (Twin Cities family law specialist volunteers that the singular problem
with the caretaker preference is that with two wage-earners the "lines are
blurred"); see also Polikoff, supra note 18, at 241. But see Pikula v. Pikula, 374
N.W.2d 705, 714 (Minn. 1985) ("[wje would expect that, as between any two
parents, one will be the primary parent even if neither conforms to the more
traditional pattern of one parent working outside the home and one within
it"); O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 539 n.227 (reviewing Minnesota cases affirming
findings that working mother was primary parent); supra notes 78-79 (litera-
ture on caretaking role of working mothers); supra notes 130-31 (stereotyping
exaggerates gaps in mothers' care); supra notes 114-15, 124 (general confidence
in applicability of caretaker preference).
165. See Lenz v. Lenz, 430 N.W.2d 168, 169 (Minn. 1988) (affirms finding
neither parent a significant caretaker); Randall v. Steward, 426 N.W.2d 465,
469-70 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (affirms placement of two children with father,
premised on equal caretaking by two working parents); Sheeran v. Sheeran,
401 N.W.2d 111, 114-15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (affirms placement of three sons
with father, premised on equal caretaking and bond with father); Kerkhoff v.
Kerkhoff, 400 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (affirms finding mother
unfit and only an equal caretaker); Schwamb v. Schwamb, 395 N.W.2d 732,
735-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirms placement of two children with father,
where mother's employment uncertain); Regenscheid v. Regenscheid, 395
N.W.2d 375, 378-80 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming placement of two children
with father citing mother's part-time work and the children's emotional bond
with father as explanation for equal caretaking finding).
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caretaking when a parent worked inside the home.lse
The final two exceptions to the caretaker standard have
not been problematic. Consistent with historic judicial skepti-
cism of joint physical custody dispositions,167 Minnesota courts
have not compromised the caretaker preference in favor of
joint physical custody.1 a8 Similarly, West Virginia case law
166. Ristvedt v. Ristvedt, No. C8-89-386 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1989)
(LEXIS, States library, Minn file) (affirms finding of equal care at time of sep-
aration because, while mother of three children was primarily responsible for
some child-caring duties, her mental health began to deteriorate at the time of
separation); Sucher v. Sucher, 416 N.W.2d 182, 184-85 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(equal caretaking where father also at home); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 403
N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (affirms finding of equal caretaking
where mother at home for all but six months of the last seven years of mar-
riage); Hemingsen v. Hemingsen, 393 N.W.2d 414, 416 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(placement of children with father affirmed based on equal parenting finding
even though mother was a traditional homemaker). See Sydnes v. Sydnes, 388
N.W.2d 3, 7 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming joint physical custody, premised
on equal care finding, where mother's employment unclear); Pekarek v.
Pekarek, 384 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Minn. CL App. 1986) (affirms equal parenting
finding, mother's work history unclear); see also Veit v. Veit, 413 N.W.2d 601,
607 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (affirms joint custody where trial court found equal
parenting, but no indication caretaking preference argued on appeal); Jor-
schumb v. Jorschumb, 390 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirms
placement with homemaker mother where trial court opted for equal parent-
ing finding instead of resolving conflicting claims of primary parenting).
167. Joint legal custody is a presumptive choice of disposition in Minnesota.
MMIN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 2 (1988). Although consenting parents now choose
it somewhat more frequently, courts have long disfavored joint physical cus-
tody. See Kaehler v. Kaehler, 219 Minn. 536, 539, 18 N.W.2d 312, 314 (1945)
(stability defeated when child is shunted back and forth between two houses);
McDermott v. McDermott, 192 Minn. 32, 36, 255 N.W. 247, 248 (1934) (divided
custody rarely serves child's interests and is appropriate only in exceptional
cases). But see Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 469-71, 495-98 (rationale sum-
marized); infra note 219 (literature on joint physical custody).
168. On numerous occasions since 1985, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
upheld the primary parent preference against the "secondary" parent's con-
tention that courts should favor joint physical care. Ozenna v. Parmelee, 407
N.W.2d 428, 432-33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), pet for rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 12,
1987) (joint physical custody placement reversed where the trial court ac-
knowledged father's primary caretaking); Ohm v. Ohm, 393 N.W.2d 411, 413
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (similar reversal in favor of mother); Gerardy v. Ger-
ardy, 391 N.W.2d 915, 918-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), pet for rev. denied (Minm.
Oct. 17, 1986) (reversal in favor of mother); Brauer v. Brauer, 384 N.W.2d 595,
598. (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming sole custody placement over father's plea
for joint physical custody); ci. Veit v. Veit, 413 N.W.2d 601, 607 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (affirming joint physical custody where no indication that primary care-
taker preference was claimed on appeal).
It is unclear at what point liberal visitation - a natural element of a sole
custody placement - becomes joint physical custody. See, e.g., MNN. STAT.
§ 518.003, subd. 3(d) (1990) (joint physical custody defined as care "structured
between" parents). This problem may explain Gorz v. Gorz, 428 N.W.2d 839,
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shows no preference for joint physical custody placements' 69
In addition, contrary to the expectations of some observers,'1 0
the exception for unfit parents has not become a significant av-
enue for defeat of the preference in Minnesota' 7 ' or in other
84243 (Mim. Ct. App. 1988), where the court affirms "joint physical" custody
with the father as the primary parent, but where the mother cared for child
every summer.
169. See infra note 149 (discussing Michael 1 v. Sandra E., 378 S.E.2d 840
(W. Va. 1989)).
170. See Chambers, supra note 43, at 562 (an unfitness exception invites fo-
cus on moral qualities of parent); O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 534 (pressure to
avoid rigid rule risks trial court efforts to stretch unfitness exception). Obser-
vations of the tendency for finding fault with care of mothers has prompted
concern on the unfitness issue. See also Fineman, supra note 43, at 766-69 (sys-
tematic criticism of mothers); Note, supra note 18, at 1375 (anticipates trial
court freedom to employ personal notions of fitness).
Much of the fear of a broad unfitness exception may trace to comparisons
between general notions of comparative fitness and the more limited legal doc-
trine of unfitness for custodial care, tantamount to neglect sufficient to permit
public intervention. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981)
(courts unable to measure relative degrees of fitness); J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD, A. SOLNIT & S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 24 (inability of deci-
sionmakers to determine comparative fitness).
171. See Tanghe v. Tanghe, 400 N.W.2d 389, 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that isolated discipline errors and emotional problems "fall short" of
unfitness). On six occasions the court of appeals affirmed findings of fitness.
See Digatono v. Digatono, 414 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Uhl v.
Uhl, 413 N.W.2d 213, 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Peterson v. Peterson, 408
N.W.2d 901, 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Surrett v. Surrett, 396 N.W.2d 870, 874
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Haasken v. Haasken, 396 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986); Novotny v. Novotny, 394 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); cf.
Rusin v. Rusin, No. CX-89-874 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 1989) (LEXIS, States
library, Minn file), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn. Jan. 23, 1990) (affirms endan-
germent finding based on evidence of rage and related misconduct toward chil-
dren); Kerkhoff v. Kerkhoff, 400 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(affirms disregard of caretaking preference on findings of emotional abuse and
neglect of medical and educational needs).
Interestingly, after the Minnesota caretaker preference was defeated by
1989 legislation, the court of appeals found additional circumstances constitut-
ing unfitness, including at least one case that appears to employ the concept
loosely. See Lind v. Lind, No. CX-89-1880 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1990)
(LEXIS, States library, Minn file) (affirmance where primary parent found to
"lack a consistent ability to distinguish between her own needs and those of
[the child]"); see also Burandt v. Burandt, No. C2-89-1887 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar.
13, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Minn file) (trial court properly disregarded
primary parenting on evidence this parent so unskilled as to risk impairing
emotional health of children).
The unfitness standard of Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 714 (Minn.
1985), employing the concept of dangerousness, parallels one condition for
modification of custody under Minnesota law. See supra note 57. Thus, modi-
fication cases may be instructive, and they include at least three cases af-
firming findings of endangerment. Keith v. Keith, 429 N.W.2d 276, 278 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988) (joint physical custody terminated on finding that continuing
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D. A LACK OF MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW
The final factor that contributed to the increase in litiga-
tion in Minnesota following adoption of the preference was the
lack of meaningful appellate review. Minnesota appellate
courts rarely corrected trial court decisionmaking and provided
little guidance to the trial courts in limiting the definition of
the caretaker preference or its exceptions. This phenomenon is
surprising because the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly rec-
ognized the importance of meaningful review toward making
the preference successful. 7 3
The lack of significant 'appellate review contrasts with de-
velopments in West Virginia, where the appellate courts pro-
vided more meaningful review of trial court decisions.174 These
changes impaired the child's emotional development); Coady v. Vi Ray, 407
N.W.2d 710, 713 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding adequate evidence to support
trial court finding that conflict of mother with children harmed mental and
emotional health of children); Bettin v. Bettin, 404 N.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (danger due to mother's association with person charged with
criminal sexual conduct with his four-year-old daughter).
Some alarm over the unfitness exception in Minnesota might be prompted
by a single reversal on a fitness finding, but the facts of the case reflect an un-
usually threatening condition of the primary parent. Jones v. Jones, 377
N.W.2d 38 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
172. Pennsylvania: Michael T.L. v. Marilyn J.L., 363 Pa. Super. 42, 525
A.2d 414, 421 (1987) (restoring custody of primary caretaker notwithstanding
trial court's concerns that primary caretaker was promiscuous, had used mari-
juana, and would be preoccupied with a newly expected child).
West Virginia: In 1989, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals re-
versed an application of the unfitness exception to sexual misconduct unre-
lated to child care, emphasizing that the exception is very narrow. David M. v.
Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 915 (W. Va. 1989). See also Bickler v. Bickler, 344
S.E.2d 630, 632 (W. Va. 1986) (per curiam) (reversing determination founded
on unfitness of primary caretaker); Allen v. Allen, 320 S.E.2d 112, 118 (W. Va.
1984) (noting that unfitness of primary caretaker must be shown "by a clear
preponderance of the evidence") (Neely, J., dissenting).
173. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (problem of meaningful
review); supra note 66 (Minnesota Supreme Court position on meaningful
review).
174. See, e.g., Heck v. Heck, 301 S.E.2d 158 (W. Va. 1982) (reversing place-
ment of two children with father where trial court refused to employ care-
taker preference); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 364 (W. Va. 1981)
(reversing placement with father); supra notes 143, 161.
A pattern of reversals in other states should also be noted. See supra
note 27 (Iowa, Pennsylvania); supra note 33 (Ohio); supra notes 34, 38 (Ore-
gon). Given, however, that none of those states expressly employs a primary
caretaking preference, their appellate decisions are not a measure of the
strength and integrity of the preference.
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differences in appellate review between Minnesota and West
Virginia exist even though both states employ a standard of
deference to trial court custody decisionmaking in the absence
of a clear abuse of discretion.175 The differing approaches in
the two states provide some support to the conclusion in a West
Virginia report that the preference produced a substantial re-
duction in strategic threats of custody litigation and an "enor-
mous" decrease in the volume of litigation.176
A study of custody appeals in Minnesota demonstrates the
lack of meaningful review by appellate courts in the state. All
but three reversals by the court of appeals occurred in cases in
which the trial court did not dispute identification of the pri-
mary caretaker but nevertheless awarded custody to the other
parent.177 In each of the three cases in which the court of ap-
peals did reverse a trial court's effort to dispute or minimize a
primary caretaker's role, the Minnesota Supreme Court subse-
175. See supra note 63 (standard of review); Graham v. Graham, 326 S.E.2d
189, 191 (W. Va. 1984) (per curiam) (reluctance to remand for findings where
merit found in trial court results); cf. Michael R. v. Sandra E., 378 S.E.2d 840,
842 (W. Va. 1989) (per curiam) (notes appellate role of scrutinizing record
where trial court disagrees with finding of master's commissioner); Gibson v.
Gibson, 304 S.E.2d 336, 339 (W. Va. 1983) (per curiam) (noting special divorce
commissioner's finding that appellant was primary caretaker).
Ohio's appellate courts also subscribe to the abuse of discretion standard.
Michel v. Michel, No. 6-87-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1989) (LEXIS, States li-
brary, Ohio file); In re Maxwell, 8 Ohio App. 3d 302, 303, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1219
(1982). Pennsylvania appellate courts do not defer to inferences drawn from
facts found by the trial court. Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa.
Super. 421, 427, 448 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1982). Oregon practices de novo review,
but nevertheless with a rule of deference. In re Marriage of Van Dyke, 48 Or.
App. 965, 968, 618 P.2d 465, 466 (1980). Iowa practices de novo review. In re
Marriage of Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896, 897 (Iowa 1982).
176. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (West Virginia report).
177. In the course of more than one hundred appellate reviews, eight trial
court decisions were reversed with finality. None of these decisions involved
problematic definitions of primary care or decisions premised on evidence of
temporary care or equal caretaking; all of these latter trial court decisions
were affirmed. See supra notes 134, 152, 165-66. Minnesota upheld the prefer-
ence only in those instances where the trial court did not dispute the identifi-
cation of the primary caretaker but the consideration was evaded, usually on
the basis of an erroneous consideration. See Maxfield v. Maxfield, 439 N.W.2d
411, 414-16 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing twisted observation that caretaker
preference was inapplicable because of long-term temporary care during the
proceedings, where that care was given by the same parent who had previously
been the primary caretaker), ff'd, 452 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 1990); Johnson v.
Johnson, 424 N.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (restoring custody of
three children to mother based on trial court's erroneous considerations);
Tanghe v. Tanghe, 400 N.W.2d 389, 392-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing on
erroneous finding of unfitness); Rimer v. Rimer, 395 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986) (trial court ignored Pikula primary caretaker standard); supra
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quently reinstated the original placement.178 Although this
course of appellate review prevented flagrant evasion of the
preference, it failed to define primary caretaking or to clarify
troublesome exceptions to the caretaker role.
The ineffectiveness of appellate review in Minnesota arises
partially from a hidden weakness in Pikula, the state's
landmark caretaker decision. The flaw exists in the supreme
court's remand to the trial court for further findings.17 9 The
note 168 (Gerardy, Ohm and Ozenna reverse erroneous regard for joint physi-
cal custody).
In only one of the eight reversals, Speltz v. Speltz, 386 N.W.2d 264, 294
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986), did an appellate court recognize primary caretaking
without a record showing the trial court acknowledged that relationship.
There, the court reversed a pre-Pikula decision and restored custody to a
traditional homemaker, where the father unsuccessfully argued that he was
heavily involved in his farm business, but also participated significantly in
caretaking. Id. at 294-95.
178. These cases include Pikula, where the intermediate court restored
custody to the mother, premised on a primary caretaker rationale, prior to the
decision announcing the preference. See Pikula v. Pikula, 349 N.W.2d 322, 326
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd in par rev'd in part, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn.
1985).
In Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 212, 217 (Minn. 1988), the supreme
court reversed a decision to restore custody of an eight-year-old child to her
mother. The court of appeals had determined that, because the evidence was
inadequate to conclude that the father was the primary caretaker, the case re-
quired a general determination of the child's best interests. Charging that the
trial court disregarded the mother's primary parenting role and finding no
support for that court's decision to split custody, the appellate court placed the
children with the mother to avoid splitting the siblings. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 413
N.W.2d 127, 134-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (en banc), rev'd, 427 N.W.2d 203
(Minn. 1988).
Finally, in Lenz v. Lenz, 430 N.W.2d 168, 169 (Minn. 1988), the supreme
court reversed an intermediate court decision that the trial court erred in its
finding that neither parent had given enough care to qualify as a primary
parent.
179. The trial court in Pikula placed custody of two daughters, ages three
and four, with their father. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court con-
cluded the placement was erroneously premised on care by the father's ex-
tended family and wrongfully ignored evidence, including a social study
clearly showing that the mother was the primary caregiver and that her care
was best for the children. Thus, the court called for a judgment placing cus-
tody of the children with their mother. Pikula, 349 N.W.2d at 326. The
supreme court affirmed reversal of the choice of the father, but reversed in
part the appellate court's award of custody to the mother. The court then re-
manded the case for a primary caretaker determination. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d
at 714.
See also Sejkow, 374 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1985) (remanding to the court of
appeals for reconsideration "in light" of Pikula). The appellate court then re-
manded for trial court findings. Seflow, 378 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
Cf. supra note 174 (review of West Virginia reversals).
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court's decision to remand rather than to reverse the case es-
tablished two propositions for future custody disputes. It sug-
gested that the primary caretaker determination was a finding
based on an observable factle ° not a matter of judgment
founded on the facts.'81 Consequently, as a matter of fact find-
ing, the subject was uniquely the prerogative of the trial court.
In addition, PikuZa reflected the supreme court's desire to im-
plement a decidedly narrow standard of review for Minnesota's
appellate courts. The Pikula court, while reversing the Court
of Appeals, stated that the court of appeals decision applied an
"inappropriate" de novo review.1 82 Two later supreme court
cases confirmed this preference for very narrow appellate re-
view of trial court decisions.18s
180. See injra note 183 (Seflcow IV court declares that evidence would sup-
port a determination that either or neither parent was the primary caretaker);
q. infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (pre-Pikula supreme court iden-
tification of primary caretaker); infr note 237 (altered standard of review an-
nounced in 1990).
181. The Pennsylvania standard of review distinguishes between facts and
judgments. See supra note 175 (for purposes of appellate review, facts distin-
guished from inferences drawn from them). The different language employed
to state the standard of review on fact finding ("clearly erroneous") and judg-
ment (abuse of discretion) implies the different standards. See FED. R. CIv. P.
52(a) (clearly erroneous standard); supra note 63 (definition of abuse of discre-
tion). Although these concepts are not easily distinguished, a distinction may
be necessary to avoid excessive deference to the initial decisionmaker.
182. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 710.
183. After remand to the trial court, the court of appeals reviewed the
Selcow case again in 1987. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 413 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (en banc) (Seflcow III), rev'd, 427 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1988) (Seflcow
IV). On remand, the trial court avoided splitting the children by placing cus-
tody of both with their father, change of custody of the youngest daughter con-
travened Minnesota modification law and both Minnesota appellate courts
determined the error. Seikow II, 413 N.W.2d at 131-33. The Selkow III court
repeated its 1985 reversal of placement of the oldest daughter, reversing a
finding that the father was the primary parent and concluding caretaking was
equal at best, thus, it determined custody principally in the interest of keeping
the children together. I& at 134-36. In Sefkow IV, the supreme court criti-
cized the appellate court for rejecting the trial court's primary parent finding,
stating that this rejection was a breach of the appellate standard of review.
Sejtow IV, 427 N.W.2d at 210-11. In a noteworthy declaration, the court ob-
served that the evidence would have supported a designation of either or
neither parent as primary caretaker. Id. at 211. The Minnesota Supreme
Court criticized the court of appeals even though the record showed (1) the
trial court premised its finding on care after the parents separated; and (2) the
court of appeals followed a Pilcula instruction to measure caretaking for the
period before separation, a rule not modified until Sefkow IV was decided. See
supra note 155 (Sefkow IV on long-term temporary custody). In addition, the
Sefkow I conclusion that the mother was primary caretaker of both children, a
decision not challenged by the supreme court in Sefkow IV, influenced the
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Ironically, because of the decisionmaking freedom given to
the trial courts in Pikula and later decisions on the standard of
appellate review, the Pikula preference might have weakened
pre-existing primary parent law in Minnesota. Minnesota
courts first identified primary caretaking as a relevant factor in
custody decisionmaking in 1974.184 During the next decade, in
contrast to almost all post-Pikula decisions, the supreme court
twice cited the importance of primary caretaking to support its
reversal of lower court placements that severed primary par-
ent-child relationships.8s5 In both cases, the appellate court
found a primary caretaking relationship without the support of
a trial court finding.
A policy of unrestricted deference to trial court decision-
making inevitably eliminates meaningful appellate review.
When appellate courts automatically defer to the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge, they surrender a responsibility to pro-
mote coherence, continuity and predictability in the law.186
court of appeals's examination of pre-separation evidence. Seiow III, 413
N.W.2d at 135. The supreme court reiterated the abuse of discretion standard
of review and implied the existence of a special, narrower standard of review
for an intermediate appellate court.
A biting dissent by three judges in Maxfteld reiterated the Sefkow III posi-
tion on appellate review. Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Minn.
1990) (Yetka, J., dissenting), qffg 439 N.W.2d 411 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
184. Erickson v. Erickson, 300 Minn. 559, 560, 220 N.W.2d 487, 489 (1974)
(per curiam) (affirming placement with mother who was primary caretaker
since child's birth).
185. Weatherly v. Weatherly, 330 N.W.2d 890, 892 (Minn. 1983) (reversing
placement of two-year-old with father because of evidence that mother had
been the primary caretaker until the parents separated); Berndt v. Berndt, 292
N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 1980) (affirming reversal of four-year-old child's placement
with father because mother had been the primary parent since the child's
birth). See also Sefkow v. Sefkow, 378 N.W.2d 72, 75-76 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(Sefliow I1) (synopsis of Minnesota precedents reversing trial court custody de-
cisions); supra note 64 (importance of caretaker standard for appellate role
since 1969).
186. See Glendon, supra note 67, at 1196, observing as follows:
As case law begins to develop under a grant of discretion, appellate
courts also have an important role to play. Rather than automatically
deferring to the "sound discretion" of the trial judge, they should, es-
pecially in the early application of a new statutory grant of discretion,
carefully examine lower court decisions to promote coherence, con-
tinuity and predictability in the case law.
A study of appellate court review of primary parenting decisions may in-
vite a dispute on whether meaningful review increases the volume of appellate
litigation, explaining some of the volume increase in Minnesota after 1985. See
supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (explanations for increased vol-
ume). That meaningful review would increase litigation is doubtful, at least in
the long term, because of the effect of a precise rule, to discourage litigation
and the threat of litigation. See supra note 70. The steady increase in num-
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Likewise, the policy of remanding cases for further trial court
findings of fact does little to improve appellate court effective-
ness. The results of appellate demands for particularized find-
ings8 7 become illusory because remands for additional findings
are not likely to change the end result.188
A study of the "Pikula remands" in Minnesota illustrates
these consequences of broad trial court discretion. Appellate
courts reversed and remanded five custody cases because the
trial courts erred in discounting the primary caretaking fac-
tor.8 9 The trial courts, however, only changed the initial place-
ment in one of these cases.19° In a second case, the parties
agreed to change the placement after the court held that the
parents were equal caretakers, thereby requiring a custody de-
cision under the general best interests test.191 The trial courts
reiterated their original placement in the three remaining re-
mands, and two of those decisions were subsequently affirmed
bers of appeals after 1985 in Minnesota is more reasonably explained as a con-
sequence of announcing or permitting development of imprecise rules.
187. See Wallin v. Wallin, 290 Minn. 261, 267, 187 N.W.2d 627, 631 (1971)
(mandating highly particularized fact finding in custody cases); supra note 65
(requirement designed to facilitate appellate review and to discipline the rea-
soning of the trial court); see also Mnookin, supra note 8, at 253-54 (implying
that findings mandate narrows trial court discretion); Wexler, supra note 53,
at 819 (prescribing findings mandate as tool to control trial court discretion).
188. At best, the value of additional findings of fact on remand is often illu-
sory. As the West Virginia Supreme Court observed in 1984, a remand for
more findings "would probably not change the end result." Graham v. Gra-
ham, 326 S.E.2d 189, 191 (W. Va 1989). See infra notes 189-92 and accompany-
ing text (a study of Pikula remands in Minnesota). See generally Pound,
supra note 10 (analysis of use of fictions as a device to avoid fixed rules in spe-
cial cases).
189. For three of the five cases, this summary reflects a reading of the offi-
cial trial court file after completion of proceedings on remand. The list of
cases excludes remands (seven) of a completely open-ended nature, where the
trial court's position on an issue could not be ascertained from its findings.
190. Steinke v. Steinke, 428 N.W.2d 579, 584 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (revers-
ing due to primary error employing joint physical custody to evade caretaker
preference).
191. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985) (reversing appellate
court determination that mother is primary parent and remanding for trial
court findings). In January 1986, the trial court on remand issued an order for
a hearing and updating of home studies. The court observed in the order,
based on its review of record, that caretaking was equal when the parties sepa-
rated, even though the mother "quite naturally for the age of the children was
the primary supplier of food, clothing, bathing, and daily needs of the chil-
dren." I& In June 1986, the judgment was amended premised on a stipulation
of the parties that the mother should be custodian and the father would enjoy
specific and liberal visitation benefits.
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on appeal.192
Thus, even in the beginning, the primary caretaker stan-
dard in Minnesota failed to meet expectations. The supreme
court's desire for limited appellate review compromised the
goals set for the standard. A willingness to loosely permit devi-
ations quickly defeated the court's announced purpose of
achieving predictable placement decisions. This narrow stan-
dard, combined with an imprecise definition of caretaking and
expansive exceptions to the general rule, made the preference
ineffective in Minnesota.
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE PREFERENCE
Minnesota opponents of the caretaker preference believe
that it has compromised gender neutrality and sacrificed chil-
dren's interests. They assert that the standard threatens gen-
der neutrality because, although it is facially neutral, in
practice the standard is biased against fathers. The preference
allegedly threatens children's interests by focusing on parental
conduct rather than the best interests of the child.193 Other
criticisms of the preference reflect a general dislike for resolv-
192. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 403 N.W.2d 892, 896-900 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(affirming trial court reinstatement of split placement of three children with
father on finding that caretaking was "essentially equal" after remand for pri-
mary parent determination). See O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 533 & nn. 208-09
(citing the Kennedy remand as an example of meaningful review).
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 378 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (Seflow II)
(remanding for primary caretaker findings, where court found compelling evi-
dence that mother was primary parent); Sefkow v. Sefkow, 413 N.W.2d 127,
135-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (en banc) (Seficow 111); Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427
N.W.2d 203, 217 (Minn. 1988) (Seflcow IV) (review of trial court decision on re-
mand to reinstate placement of older child and change placement of youngest
child from mother to father; change of youngest child reversed, but supreme
court affirms placement of oldest child under general best interests rationale,
recognizing four and one-half years temporary placement with father).
Rosen v. Rosen, 398 N.W.2d 38, 40-41 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (remanding
pre-Pikula placement of three children with father for findings on primary
caretaking premised on finding of equal caretaking).
193. These attacks are intended to refute the assertion that the caretaker
preference deals safely with gender neutrality concerns and vital interests of
children, both of which are part of the rationale for the preference. See supra
notes 90-99 and accompanying text. This criticism refers to results of the pref-
erence in terms of substantive decisions on custody. So long as caretaking is
defined in conduct-related language that begs for acrimonious disagreements,
the standard directs attention toward the justice interests of the parents and
away from the child's interests. See supra note 136 and accompanying text
(child welfare concern suggested by survey results on custody disputes under
Minnesota caretaker preference). Proponents of the preference suggest cor-
recting this problem by producing a definition of caretaking that is less prone
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ing individual custody cases with a precise principle. 194
These opponents are not concerned with the ineffective-
ness of the standard. Rather, they contend that injustices re-
sult from the zealous application of a mechanical standard.
Opponents, for example, criticize appellate courts not because
of their failure to define the preference, but because of their af-
firmance of its application. 9 5 The assertion of these concerns
has produced much litigation relating to the preference; as ad-
vocates of a best interests standard engage in successful attacks
on the preference, its clarity diminishes, thus encouraging more
litigation.196 In Minnesota, this opposition eventually led to a
legislative rejection of the primary caretaker preference. 197
Part of the reason for the defeat of the preference is the
Minnesota Supreme Court's failure to acknowledge that appli-
cation of the standard does compromise some conflicting inter-
ests.198 Because the court did not acknowledge any sacrifices,
their eventual appearance signified that supporters had failed
to anticipate such adverse effects. Thus, the discovery that the
standard compromised the interests of children and fathers un-
dermined its pretended certainty and safety.
In contrast, other advocates of the preference, notably the
West Virginia Supreme Court, concede that the preference
to acrimony and distortion. There is no evidence that this criticism has advo-
cated weakening or abolishing the caretaker preference. I&
194. Professor Elster analyzed the tendency of decisionmakers to adopt "an
irrational belief in the possibility of a rational preference." Elster, supra note
53, at 2-3. See Pearson & Ring, supra note 8, at 723 (common opposition of
trial judges to any standards narrowing the decisionmaking discretion).
195. See, e.g., Bear v. Bear, 415 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(placement with mother where primary caretaking disputed and evaluators
recommended custody with father); Goose v. Goose, 406 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (trial court finds mother is primary caretaker of nine-month-old
child notwithstanding father's contribution in the last month before separa-
tion, hence custody awarded to mother even though father offered more stabil-
ity and cooperation with other parent and thus would be best for child).
196. These concerns frequently account for decisions refusing to strictly ad-
here to the caretaker preference. See, e.g., Sheeran v. Sheeran, 401 N.W.2d
111, 114 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (custody awarded to father based on finding
that neither parent functioned as the primary caretaker); Regenscheid v.
Regenscheid, 395 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (custody awarded to
father based on finding that both parents shared equally in the caretaker role);
In re Marriage of Maddox, 56 Or. App. 345, 348, 641 P.2d 665, 667 (1982)
(neither parent functioned as primary caretaker; custody awarded to father
based on his ability to provide a more stable environment). A Minnesota trial
judge observed that cases like these "reflect a belief [of trial judges] that we
can decide who will do a better job." Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67.
197. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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compromises certain interests,199 but knowingly accept such
consequences to avoid the greater dangers of excessive litiga-
tion. They contend that, although the preference might
threaten the interests of some fathers and children, the alterna-
tive risk of unabated litigation poses a greater danger to par-
ents and children who suffer from prolonged court disputes.2°°
Thus, any injustice in the primary caretaker preference has less
social cost than injustice in the best interests standard.
Defenders of the caretaker preference further argue that
interests compromised -by the preference are those general
"best interests" considerations that cannot be reliably mea-
sured, if they are measurable at all. Therefore, any efforts to
protect these interests lead to increased litigation, strategic
threats of litigation, and results that only reflect the personal
sentiments of the decisionmaker. 201 As the Garska court ob-
served, "[c]ertainly if we believed from our experience that
full-blown hearings on child custody between two fit parents
199. The David M. court has most emphatically expressed this view to
date:
Our rule inevitably involves some injustice to fathers who, as a group,
are usually not primary caretakers. There are instances when the pri-
mary caretaker will not be the better custodian in the long run....
Although the primary caretaker parent presumption may appear
cut-and-dried and insufficiently sensitive to the needs of individual
children, it serves the welfare of the child by achieving stability of
care in the child's life, reducing the uncertainty of custody decisions,
limiting the invasiveness of the custody determination process and re-
ducing the expense of domestic litigation. Because litigation per se
can be the cause of serious emotional damage to children (and to
adults), we consider the primary caretaker parent presumption to be
in the best interests of children. Even more important, children can-
not be used as pawns in fights that are actually about money because
a lawyer can tell a primary caretaker parent that, if fit, that parent
has absolutely no chance of losing custody of very young children.
The result is that questions of alimony, property distribution, and
child support are settled on their own merits.
David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 923, 925 (W. Va. 1989). See Uviller,
supra note 43, at 130 (acknowledgment that caretaker preference rewards
mothers, at the expense of more financially secure fathers, for their past com-
mitment to child care); supra notes 90-99 (mostly undeveloped rationale on
gender neutrality and full response to needs of children).
200. Cf. Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 16, at 203 (presumption that mother
is entitled to custody has a lower "social cost" than statutory alternative that
results in more contested cases and increased risk of custody award to unfit
parent).
201. See R. NEELY, supra note 8, at 24, 60, 66, 73-76, 80 (function of care-
taker preference not for choice of parent alone, but also to improve the pro-
cess of choosing the custodial parent); supra notes 62, 67-68 (best interests
decisions unpredictable and factors unmeasurable); see, eg., Mnookin, supra
note 8, at 286-87 (problematic to measure child's psychological relationships).
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would afford more intelligent child placement than an arbi-
trary rule, we would not have adopted an arbitrary rule."32°2
Critics of the caretaker preference, however, contend that
the preference disregards at least five primary child inter-
ests.203 First, they argue that application of the standard can
imperil important parent-child bonds.2 4 They dispute the pref-
erence's presumption that a child's more valuable parental
bond is with the primary caretaker.20 5 Opponents suggest the
need for an examination of the intimacy of each parent's rela-
202. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981). In David M., 385
S.E.2d at 923, the West Virginia court observed:
Yet there is no guarantee that the courts will be able to know, in ad-
vance and based on the deliberately distorted evidence that character-
izes courtroom custody proceedings, when such is the case. And,
notwithstanding its theoretical imperfections, the primary caretaker
parent presumption acknowledges that exhaustive hearings on rela-
tive degrees of parenting ability rarely disclose any but the most gross
variations in skill and suitability.
Id. at 923. Discussing judicial decisionmaking, the court added:
No issue is more subject to personal bias than a decision about which
parent is "better." Should children be placed with an "open, em-
pathetic" father or with a "stern but value-supporting" mother? The
decision may hinge on the judge's memory of his or her own parents
or on his or her distrust of an expert whose eyes are averted once too
often. It is unlikely that the decision will be the kind of individual-
ized justice that the system purports to deliver.
Id. at 919. A Minnesota judge volunteered the observation that "no precise
standard will gain acceptance unless judges acknowledge that we can't always
tell who will do best as a parent for a particular child." Minnesota Surveys,
supra note 67.
203. Mnookin, supra note 8, at 282-87 (custody standards omit qualitative
considerations); see Note, supra note 18, 1360-68 (indictment of best interest
rationale in Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985), and reciting omitted inter-
ests of the child: protection of sibling relationships; physical, social and intel-
lectual development; adequate guidance; protection of background in culture;
housing-, school and community contact; and predictably stable post-divorce
care). For a wide-ranging and thoughtful list of subtle best interests factors,
see Beaber, Custody Quagmir" Some Psycholegal Dilemmas, J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 309, 325-26 (1982).
204. See Baland, supra note 242, at 32 (contending primary caretaker rela-
tionship is distinguishable from psychological parenting relationship); Cham-
bers, supra note 43, at 533 (weakest part of preference is that "it exaggerates
the importance of the bond to the primary-caretaker parent in comparison to
the bond with the other parent"); O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 534-37 (preference
generally fails to consider whether the non-primary caretaker is the "primary
psychological parent").
205. See supra notes 51-55 (literature and cases on ties between primary
caretaking and bonding); supra notes 119-21 (ties between bonding and Garska
factors); see also Seymour v. Seymour, 180 Conn. 705, 711-12, 433 A.2d 1005,
1008 (1980) (concept of psychological parent "not a fixed star by which custody
decisions can invariably be guided"); Mnookin, supra note 8, at 286-87 (highly
problematic to evaluate psychological bonding).
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tionship with the child.2 °w Furthermore, critics argue that the
preference inaccurately measures bonding by focusing on the
quantity of care provided. Rather, they contend that the proper
focus should be on the quality of care, such as a parent's "ethi-
cal, emotional, and intellectual guidance. ' '2° Supporters of the
preference, however, respond that the bonding factor may be
the least measurable of the best interests factors2°s and that it
invites acrimonious disagreement on the quality of past
parenting.' 9
Second, opponents of the caretaker preference criticize the
standard's inevitable emphasis on the past. They believe that in
some situations, the past should be discounted to properly look
ahead, because of the opportunity for new or changed relation-
ships.210 They also challenge the utility of past conduct as a
predictor of future behavior.2 "l Proponents of the preference,
however, contend that past caretaking patterns are the most re-
liable indicator of a good future relationship 22 and that subjec-
tive predictions of future relationships are unreliable.213
206. Crippen & Hatling, supra note 22, at 419-21.
207. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 540, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 806, 724 P.2d
486, 492 (1986); see also Bashus v. Bashus, 393 N.W.2d 748, 752 (N.D. 1986)
("there is more to being a primary caretaker than the time spent in primary
care"); Mnookin, supra note 8, at 282-87 (custody standards should consider
quality of care issues); supra notes 121-22 (other authorities on quality of care
issue).
Several Minnesota lawyers and judges volunteered criticism of the Garska
factors. One suggested that the factors omitted the "real issue" of identifying
the parent sought out by the child in stressful issues. Minnesota Surveys,
supra note 67. Another called for determining the parent who gives the most
emotional support. Id.
208. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text; see also supra notes
130-33 and accompanying text (risks of gender stereotyping).
210. The issue of changing relationships centers mostly on the problem of
temporary custody arrangements. But see supra notes 151-57 and accompany-
ing text (legal pitfall in rewarding spouse who gains temporary custodial
advantage).
211. In addition, there are concerns regarding the need for more reliable
prediction of future relationships. See O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 543 (advocat-
ing consideration of "confusing and complicating conduct" after the separation
in determining which parent is the primary caretaker); Note, supra note 18, at
1366-67 (challenging utility of past conduct as a predictor of future behavior).
212. See Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. 421, 448
A.2d 1113, 1115 (1982) (that future caretaking is most sensibly premised on
past behavior); Fineman, supra note 43, at 771 (past care best predictor of fu-
ture care); Uviller, supra note 43, at 130 ("past commitment should be re-
flected in custodial priority"); supra note 126 (explaining Garska reasoning).
213. See supra note 201 (setting forth subjective, unmeasurable considera-
tions). It is very difficult to predict behavior after divorce. See Chambers,
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A third criticism is that greater consideration should be
given to which parent is the better provider of certain types of
critical care, such as health care, education and religious train-
ing.214 Critics argue that the preference does not sufficiently
emphasize these special needs of children. Proponents of the
preference, however, again respond that a child's primary care-
taker is the parent who is more likely to supply such needs in
the future.215
Fourth, some critics dislike the preference because it might
imperil close child contact with both parents. They contend
that children need active contact with both parents, contact
that can be best guaranteed through arrangements such as
shared custody, divided custody and joint physical custody.216
Concern for preserving a child's relationship with both parents
has led to numerous discussions of alternative preferences, in-
cluding the friendly parent preference, which favors the parent
who is more likely to support the child's relationship with the
other parent.217 Such proposals, however, are complex and con-
troversial. Commentators have observed that children might
be adversely affected by both the friendly parent preference218
supra note 43, at 483-84; Mnookin, supra note 8, at 229; Scott & Derdeyn,
supra note 8, at 467. This observation casts doubt on the reliability of primary
caretaking as a predictor, but even more doubt on other, less measurable
means of prediction.
214. See Note, supra note 8, at 1361 n.80 (suggesting that consideration of
these developmental factors is mandated by Minnesota's multi-factor statute).
215. See supra note 212. Another offsetting consideration is the interest in
omitting factors that give preference to the most financially able parent See
Chambers, supra note 43, at 538-41.
216. The primary caretaker preference has been treated as a preference for
sole custody, leaving only the topic of visitation to deal with the non-custodial
parent-child relationship. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text; see
also Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 468-71, 495-98 (rationale for the expan-
sion of the joint custody preference and summary of effects of implementing
joint custody preference).
217. See Randall v. Steward, 426 N.W.2d 465, 469-70 (Min. Ct. App. 1988)
(finding that father more likely to support child's relationship with mother);
Ryan v. Ryan, 393 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Mnn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that mother
more likely to support child's ongoing relationship with the father); see also
Charlow, supra note 53, at 281-88 (supporting a preference favoring parent
most willing and able to reduce parental conflict and who puts the child's in-
terests ahead of other concerns); Fineman, supra note 43, at 751 n.104 (statutes
favoring friendly parent).
218. See R. NEELY, supra note 8, at 38 (when friendly parenting becomes
subject of rule, distortions rid it of utility); Elster, supra note 53, at 6 (noting
"Catch-22" of friendly parent approach - the tendency to penalize parents
seeking sole custody); Schulman & Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Cus-
tody: Analysis of Legislation and Its Implications for Women and Children,
12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 539, 554-56 (1982) (dangers of friendly parent pref-
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and joint physical custody.21 9 A complete discussion of the
merits of these alternative custody preferences and arrange-
ments is beyond the scope of this Article. It is sufficient to rec-
ognize that alternatives exist and receive support from some
critics of the preference.
Finally, opponents of the primary caretaker preference ar-
gue that it fails to provide some children with protection
against harmful caretaking that does not constitute unfitness or
clearly dangerous conduct. Thus, the preference might favor a
parent who provides the greater quantity of caretaking, but
whose nurturing skills are inadequate.22 Proponents of the
standard, however, allege that a loose unfitness standard would
introduce more uncertainty and acrimony and would likely pro-
mote increased litigation.2 21
erence in promoting insincere joint custody requests and continuing contact
with abusive parent); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 474-77, 479-81 (friendly
parent preferences, like cooperation condition of joint custody preference, im-
pairs assertiveness and induces distorted pictures of friendliness).
219. Controversy is growing on joint physical custody placements. See
Charlow, supra note 53, at 280 (interest in reduction of conflict more critical
than interest in contact with both parents); Reidy, Silver & Carlson, supra
note 53, at 81, 85 (trial judges disfavor joint physical custody in disputed cases
and favor sole custody for primary caretaking parent); Steinman, The Eaperi-
ence of Children in a Joint-Custody Arrangement A Report of a Study, 51
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403, 412 (1981) (pain of separation from one parent
less than sense of loss of original family arrangement); Steinman, supra note
111, at 751 (higher risk of failure where joint custody is court-imposed); supra
note 167 (Minnesota case law disfavoring moving children back and forth be-
tween houses); see generally J. WELLARSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, SECOND
CHANCES 282-94 (1989) (researchers document long-term danger to children in
continuous changes of living environment); Elster, supra note 53, at 458, 471-
74, 484, 490-98 (joint custody should be confined to cases where arrangement
volunteered by both parents); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 40 (danger in
court-imposed joint custody).
Similar controversy exists concerning the preservation of sibling relation-
ships. See supra notes 178, 183 (discussing Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203
(Minn. 1988) (Seficow IV) (regarding the uncertainty of Minnesota law on sig-
nificance of splitting custody of siblings); Note, supra note 8, at 1361 n.80 (rela-
tionship between siblings should be considered in awarding custody).
220. As one rural Minnesota judge expressed his concern, the preference
may compel care by a parent who "is not good at it." Minnesota Surveys,
supra note 67. A local bar group complained that the preference could favor a
parent with little capacity for "nurturing." Id. See Seymour v. Seymour, 180
Conn. 705, 712, 433 A.2d 1005, 1008 (1980) (although recognizing psychological
parenting as a best interests factor, court notes that "a court has an independ-
ent responsibility to assure itself of the suitability of the parent to whom the
child is primarily attached"); Goose v. Goose, 406 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (primary caretaker preference favors parent thought by trial court to of-
fer less stability and less willingness to cooperate on visitation).
221. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text (bitterness and distor-
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Critics of the preference frequently emphasize these five
concerns to support their opposition to the caretaker standard.
In addition, fathers criticize the preference because of its disre-
gard for their caretaking efforts and contributions of earnings
and labor for the general welfare of the family.222 They argue
that courts should have the discretion to place custody with a
secondary parent or at least to eliminate the preference in cases
in which the secondary parent has made a substantial caretak-
ing contribution.223 Many of these critics believe that the pri-
mary caretaker preference is merely a pretext to support
mothers rather than fathers.224 In response, proponents of the
preference argue that fathers desire broad, vague standards as
tools to advance unwarranted custody claims. 9 5
In Minnesota, criticism of the caretaker preference by fa-
thers and their defenders generally did not include a specific
tion in primary caretaker disputes); supra note 170 (concerns over litigation on
unfitness exception to caretaker preference); supra note 199 (aim of caretaker
preference to stick with measurable factor). In fact, courts often express con-
cern over care by the primary parent by a more general statement that the
other parent would be a "better" custodian.
222. A Twin Cities family law specialist asks rhetorically. "Should a father
be denied custody because a mother works part-time or does not work at all
due to a mutual decision on the part of both parents at a time when divorce
was not considered by either of them?" Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67.
"Many fathers," a family court referee adds, "view the preference as penaliz-
ing them for providing for their family." Id See Wexler, supra note 53, at 818
(recommending an initial custody decision "that gives something to both
parties").
223. See supra notes 158-66 (equal care exception); supra notes 204-19 (re-
lationship with second caretaker; uncertainty and danger of loose standard).
224. See O'Kelly, supra note 18, at 540 (suspicion of bias in caretaker pref-
erence hinders acceptance of standard); supra notes 78-79 (caretaker prefer-
ence beneficial for mothers); supra note 93 (perception of preference as tender
years presumption for mothers); supra notes 130-31 (bias reports on favor for
mothers). A Minnesota lawyer adds that if caretaking cannot be equated with
the child's best interests, its application is pure gender bias. Minnesota
Surveys, supra note 67; see also Charlow, supra note 53, 273-74 (observing
prospect for bad settlements by fathers who should challenge custody place-
ments but are intimidated by belief that court will not deviate from preference
for mother).
225. See supra notes 78-79, 162 (courts and commentators have asserted
that the reality of mothers' role in childrearing accounts for vast majority of
decisions awarding custody to the mother; consequently, equal care arrange-
ments reflect bias against women); supra notes 82-88 (discussion of settlements
by mothers). This issue was brought to life in David M. v. Margaret M., 385
S.E.2d 912, 923 (W. Va. 1989), where the West Virginia court stated that prac-
tices under an imprecise standard are partial to men: "[A]ny rule concerning
custody matters will be gender-biased, in effect if not in form. An allegedly
gender-neutral rule that permits exhaustive inquiry into relative degrees of
paternal fitness is inevitably going to favor men in most instances." I&i at 923.
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analysis of shortcomings in the formulation of the standard.
Rather, they proposed eliminating the standard to recognize pa-
ternal interests. Critics feared that application of the prefer-
ence would frequently lead to a loss of custody for fathers,
followed by inadequate protection of the noncustodial parent's
visitation rights. Minnesota's liberal allowance for a custodial
parent to move a child to another state exacerbated the fear
that fathers might lose any meaningful relationship with the
child following the custody placement.2
Inevitably, expression of the foregoing concerns created
much debate concerning the merits of the primary caretaker
preference. In Minnesota, however, opposition to the standard
caused more than mere debate: politica 227 and legalam argu-
ments ultimately produced legislation defeating the preference
prescribed by the supreme court in Pikula. Several factors sug-
226. See Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minm. 1983) (noncustodial par-
ent opposing move has burden of showing that change hurts the child or is
designed to interfere with visitation). Clearly, fathers' concerns do not stop at
eliminating the unfair advantage for the mother under the primary caretaker
preference. Rather, fathers also unite on the issue of any standard leading to
sole custody placements. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 8, at 462, 495-96
(legislative efforts of fathers for joint custody preference); see also Wexler,
supra note 53, at 765-73 (trend is for more permissive laws on modification of
prior custody placements).
227. See supra note 4. The 1989 Minnesota legislation responded affirma-
tively to the remarkably solid position of the Minnesota State Bar Association,
determined at a February 1989 meeting of the group's House of Delegates.
The bar initiative evolved from a recommendation of the organization's Family
Law Section, which spoke without dissent on the subject. Members of the bar
noted the largely unchallenged rationale for eliminating the preference: fa-
thers among the clientele of family law practitioners were oppressed by a stan-
dard that overlooked their strong parent-child relationship. These lawyers
also came to believe that children were hurt by placements. Litigation oc-
curred only where fathers demonstrated significant relationships with their
children. Observers of the 1989 legislative event noted only one voice in favor
of the primary caretaker preference, a modest lobbying effort by battered
womens' groups.
228. Legal criticism of the Pikula rationale along with a push for a multi-
factor test partially precipitated the legislative defeat of Minnesota's prefer-
ence. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1990); Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452
N.W.2d 219, 222 (Minn. 1990) (acknowledging statute); Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427
N.W.2d 203, 211 (Minn. 1988) (Seflcow IV) (same); supra note 94 (indictment of
preference, citing omitted considerations on child's best interests); supra notes
67-68, 199 (judicial explanations for narrowing considerations). Even without
reference to inconsistent legislation, the basis for judicial imposition of a sub-
stantive standard has been questioned. One Minnesota trial judge active in
family law litigation noted. "It is very disturbing that this entire theory was
given us by edict of the supreme court without legislative debate, without de-
velopment by litigants, without testimony of experts or any other thorough
look at all aspects of the theory." Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67.
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gest explanations for the opposition's remarkable success. Cer-
tainly, critics of the preference demonstrated skillful advocacy.
In addition, the legislative approach prevented direct confronta-
tion with the supreme court, and thereby successfully avoided
facing serious proponents of the preference. On the other
hand, critics of the rule had already argued their case to the
supreme court and had successfully gained that court's partial
retreat from the preference.22 More significantly, the supreme
court's own desire for limited appellate reviewW° and its allow-
ance of broad definitions and exceptions to the standardn' con-
tributed to efforts to defeat the preference. In addition, the
court's failure to acknowledge that the preference would com-
promise certain interests caused the preference to later appear
as misconceived. Perhaps demographic factors also contributed
to the rejection; paternal care might be unusually active in the
relatively progressive Minnesota families. Finally, the per-
ceived weakness in enforcement of visitation rights in Minne-
sota was a significant factor in the political defeat of the
preference in 1989.
V. AN EPILOGUE TO MINNESOTA'S EXPERIENCE
A recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision signals a pos-
sible resurrection of some form of the primary caretaker pref-
erence, despite the legislature's repeated rejection of the
standard. In Maxfield v. Maxfeld 2 the court decided its first
child custody case since the 1989 legislative enactment that at-
tempted to abolish the primary caretaker standard. The major-
ity, although recognizing the legislature's retreat from a legal
preference, stated that "the golden thread running through any
best interests analysis is the importance, for a young child in
particular, of its bond with the primary parent."' ' 3 The
supreme court approved the court of appeals reversal of a deci-
229. See supra notes 178, 183 (discussing decision in Sefkow).
230. See supra notes 63-66, 173-92.
231. See supra notes 116-34, 145-66 and accompanying text.
232. 452 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 1990), affg 439 N.W.2d 411 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
233. I at 223. After contending its prior decisions already reflected the
declarations of the legislature, the supreme court addressed Maxfield under
the rubric of a multi-factor analysis - a different approach than that taken by
the court of appeals. Because the trial court also made findings on all statu-
tory best interests factors, this review was feasible. See supra notes 4-5 and




sion to place four children with their father24 and concluded
that the trial judge erred in disregarding, "or at least severely
discount[ing]" the mother's status as primary parent.2
The Maxfield decision presents another irony in Minne-
sota's experience with the primary caretaker preference. As
discussed earlier, implementation of the caretaker standard un-
expectedly resulted in judicial decisions that provided less sup-
port for strong parent-child relationships than those decided
before implementation of the standard.2s6 Maxfield, a bold re-
versal decided after legislative defeat of the preference, demon-
strates yet another irony. The court applied the new, multi-
factor Minnesota statute, which the legislature apparently in-
tended to provide less protection for the preservation of a
child's relationship with a primary caretaker. Yet, in its appli-
cation of the law, the court strengthened, rather than weak-
ened, its support for preservation of this relationship. In doing
so, the majority restored its will for appellate decisionmaking,
thus returning to the forcefulness of pre-Pikula law and de-
parting from Pikula's remand discipline.237
234. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d at 223. See Maxfield v. Maxfield, 439 N.W.2d
411, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing trial court's decision because excep-
tion to preference was used wrongfully). After this decision and before discre-
tionary review by the supreme court, 1989 legislation prohibited giving priority
to primary caretaking or any other best interest factor to the exclusion of the
other factors. MIN. STAT. § 518.17 subd. 1(a) (1989). See supra note 4 (compo-
nents on the 1989 act).
235. Maxfteld, 452 N.W.2d at 222. In spite of a resolve to apply no prefer-
ence, the supreme court addressed the topic of primary caretaking. The court
noted that the trial judge not only disregarded the old preference, but erred by
entirely discarding the consideration of prior care. This so skewed the entire
best interests inquiry that reversal was appropriate. The supreme court pro-
ceeded to discuss and refute all six of the major best interests considerations
the trial court offered to favor placing the children with their father. I& at
222-23.
236. See supra notes 184-85 (examining pre-Pikula cases).
237. In sharp contrast with an earlier indication that custody decisionmak-
ing was a matter of factfinding, see supra text accompanying note 180, the
court made this remarkable declaration:
Our concern here is not with the findings of fact but with the conclu-
sions drawn from those facts. Particularly in cases of this kind, where
the trial court is weighing statutory criteria in light of the found basic
facts, the trial court's conclusions of law will include determination of
mixed questions of law and fact, determination of "ultimate" facts,
and legal conclusions. In such a blend, the appellate court may cor-
rect erroneous applications of the law. As to the trial court's conclu-
sions on the ultimate issues, mindful of the discretion accorded the
trial court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, the reviewing
court reviews under an abuse of discretion standard. See, eg., Berndt
v. Berndt, 292 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 1980). When the trial court's treat-
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The three dissenting judges strongly contested the appel-
late court's reversal of the trial court decision.m8 They accused
the court of appeals of substituting its own findings of fact for
those of the trial court.239 Furthermore, the dissenters harshly
criticized the majority for circumventing the clear intent of the
legislature to eliminate presumptions in child custody- cases.240
The divided opinions are a classic illustration of the continuing
debate between the need for a rule of law and the competing
desire for more individualized justice.24'
Maxfield provoked strong criticism, including an outspoken
published response of the trial judge in the case. 4 The Minne-
sota legislature also responded to the decision, restating that
Minnesota law does not allow for a primary caretaker presump-
tion.243 This legislative action, however, was an ineffective re-
sponse to the supreme court's opinion; the Maxfield court itself
had acknowledged the legislature's elimination of the prefer-
ence.24 In fact, the court had recognized in a 1988 decision that
the Minnesota statute mandated a "multifaceted inquiry" to de-
termine a child's best interests.245 Moreover, in emphasizing
the importance of the relationship between a child and a pri-
ment of mixed questions of law and fact and its treatment of the ulti-
mate issues may involve a misapplication of the law, the appellate
court should carefully review the trial court's "expla[nation of] how
the factors led to its conclusions and to the determination of the best
interests of the child."
Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d at 221 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1990)). See
supra notes 184-85 (examining pre-Pikula cases); supra notes 179-83 and ac-
companying text (weakness built into original decision on strong preference).
The Maxfzeld court restated concepts illustrated by pre-Pikula cases, quoting
from Berndt. Maxfteld, 452 N.W.2d at 221, 223. See also supra note 185
(Berndt discussed).
238. Maxield, 452 N.W.2d at 224 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
239. I&
240. Id
241. See supru notes 8-15 and accompanying text (discussing the competing
notions of desire for clear rules and the need for discretionary flexibility in in-
dividual cases).
242. Baland, Maxfield's Silver Hammer: New Shape for Child Custody?, 47
BENCH & BAR MINN., No. 4, 31 (1990). The author finds "a curious blend of lip
service and double talk" in the high court majority's treatment of the 1989 leg-
islation. Id. at 33. He suggests that the majority was guilty of "abuse and
usurpation of the trial court's discretion" in the pursuit of its "gospel" of con-
cern for the primary caretaker. Id. Calling for the supreme court to admit its
mistake, and protesting the current uncertainty of Minnesota child custody
law, the author advises the supreme court to reconsider its opinion and deliver
a "decision that answers more questions than it raises." Id. at 34.
243. See supra note 5.
244. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d at 222.
245. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 212 (Minn. 1988) (Sefiow IV).
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mary caretaker, the court did not expressly adopt a caretaker
preference. Rather, it identified primary caretaking as a
"thread" woven through the useable best interests factors set
forth in the statute.m Thus, Maxfteld is a plausible application
of Minnesota statutory law, inclusive of the 1990 amendment.
The divisiveness of the Maxfield opinions and the major-
ity's departure from its usual support of narrow standards of
appellate review make it difficult to predict whether Maxfield
is a fascinating case study or the beginning of a new era of pri-
mary caretaking law.Y7 Certainly, trial courts may make pri-
mary caretaking the decisive factor in close cases in which all
other factors between the parties are equal.m Moreover, a
lower court's disregard of a primary caretaker's role may pro-
vide a basis for reversal on appeal.249
Among the nation's appellate courts, the West Virginia
Supreme Court now alone remains committed to achieving cer-
tainty in child custody decisionmaking and to establishing a
workable caretaker preference. A similar commitment in Min-
nesota failed because of the opposition's fight to protect com-
peting interests and because of the Minnesota Supreme Court's
reluctance to actively establish a rule of law on child custody
adjudication. Nevertheless, the desire to avoid litigation
through more certain standards, an aim rooted in history, re-
mains on the scene for discussion in Minnesota.
246. Maxfeld, 452 N.W.2d at 223.
247. The dissent in Maxfkie concluded that the majority opinion "will en-
courage more appeals in family law matters." Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d at 224
(Yetka, J., dissenting). Given the litigation flowing from this supposedly pre-
cise standard, the prediction seems accurate.
The dissent next observed that the majority opinion would encourage
more reversals. Id. This prophecy, however, is much more in doubt. Will the
Maxfield concern on primary care evidence be a new tool for appellate review?
See supra note 185 (reversals under pre-Pikula law). Even if this tool exists,
will it consistently be evaded by trial court comments or findings suggesting
that caretaking has been considered, even if discarded?
248. See Enget v. Enget, No. CX-90-315 (Minn. Ct. App. June 26, 1990)
(LEXIS, States library, Minn file) (suggesting that Maxfweld primary caretaker
role may be determinative where other factors are equal).
249. See Terdan v. Terdan, No. C7-90-62 (Minn. Ct. App. July 9, 1990)
(LEXIS, States library, Minn file) (absent validity of child's choice, it is revers-
ible error under Maxfield to disregard primary caretaker factor); cf Montgom-
ery v. Montgomery, No. CX-90-458 (Minn. Ct. App. July 24, 1990) ( EXIS,
States library, Minn file) (approves giving weight to primary caretaking as




The Minnesota experience provides guidance for propo-
nents of many conflicting approaches to the resolution of cus-
tody disputes. For defenders of a caretaker preference, it is
increasingly evident that the ends they envision will not be eas-
ily achieved. Advocacy for the preference will require a careful
assessment of its potential to sacrifice interests of fathers and
children,25° an acknowledgement of the likely resistance from
supporters of such interests, and a strategy to minimize conflict
that will inevitably destroy the effectiveness and acceptability
of the more precise standard. Defenders of the preference
might also recognize the need for a much tighter standard to
significantly discourage litigation and unfair bargaining. 251 If
caretaking is to be determinative, it must be defined so as to
narrow the inquiry and focus on matters of fact least likely to
invite bitter disputes and distortion of facts.252 Furthermore,
the exceptions for equal caretaking253 and temporary custody
arrangements following separation 2-A should be narrowly inter-
preted, and a child's express custody preference should not gov-
ern unless it is clear and convincing. Finally, an effective
preference will require informed and determined appellate
review.2 6
For opponents of the preference, integrity demands a rec-
ognition of the rationale for the standard. They must face criti-
cism of the broad best interests standard, which risks unwise
results,257 stimulates litigation,2 s permits manipulation and
250. See supra notes 83-99, 199 (although most proponents imprecisely
identify effects of a more precise standard, some recognize the issues).
251. See Mason, supra note 59 (defending more straightforward preference
for mothers as custodians).
252. See supra notes 116-36 and accompanying text. What are the safe is-
sues of fact, those likely to be objectively observed? This is a difficult question
that literature in the area has not yet addressed. An example of a less-emo-
tionally charged factor might be the measure of family schedules and identifi-
cation of the parent who enjoyed the most time or activity with the child; even
where both parents work, one might expect a significant variation on this fac-
tor. What seems most appropriate now is for others to examine the practical-
ity of the Gamka factors. See supra text accompanying note 45.
253. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 63-64, 173-92, 232-47 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 62, 67-68 (best interests decisions unpredictable, fac-
tors unmeasurable); supra notes 201-02 (best interests considerations
unmeasurable).
258. See supra notes 70-81, 100-15 and accompanying text.
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abuse, and allows a level of judicial discretion that is difficult to
reconcile with an historic commitment to the rule of law.2 59
The costs of this system, especially for children, mothers and
those with the least resources to resist threats of litigation, are
readily apparent. ° In addition, critics, along with defenders of
the preference, should carefully assess the interests sacrificed
through application of the primary caretaker preference.
Finally, for the more neutral student of this issue, the Min-
nesota experience emphasizes the tension between a need for
predictable results and a desire for individualized decisionmak-
ing.26 1 It provides little hope for resolution of the debate
among opponents and supporters of the preference. The recent
Maxfield decision, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
sharply and equally divided on the fundamental question of the
merits of a discretionary approach to child custody decision-
making, illustrates the intensity of the debate.262
The Minnesota experience thus does not resolve the child
custody dilemma. It does, however, suggest several proposals
for future decisionmaking. A complete discussion of these pro-
positions is beyond the scope of this Article. Alternative stan-
dards and practices are the subject of voluminous scholarly
studies, as well as numerous appellate decisions and legislative
enactments. This Article merely suggests that these reforms
might be more helpful than mere argument on the merits of
the caretaker preference.
First, researchers should more carefully examine the mer-
its of the caretaker preference dispute, with a focus on discov-
ering empirical evidence of the effects of various types of
parent care on patterns of child development and studying the
costs associated with precise and imprecise standards. For ex-
ample, evidence is needed on whether past caretaking is an ac-
curate predictor of future care and whether certain care
259. See supra notes 10-16, 62-68 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 52-59, 73-89 and accompanying text. The reality of
these problems under an imprecise standard accounts for a school of thought,
not wholly tongue-in-cheek, that a coin-flip decision would be a reasonable al-
ternative if no other is found. See Elster, supra note 53, at 40 n.21 (citing five
other discussions of the coin-flipping alternative); Fineman, supra note 43, at
773 (noting that the coin-flip alternative is the ultimate recognition that equal-
ity is an unrealistic goal in decisionmaking); see also Klaff, supra note 3, at
358-59 (discussing problems inherent in the coin-flip alternative); Uviller,
supra note 43, at 127 (stating that a coin-flip may be preferable to a best inter-
ests test).
261. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 232-47 and accompanying text.
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patterns correlate with strong parent-child bonding. Further
study should also address how frequently threats of litigation
actually result in unfair stipulations and settlements. In addi-
tion, researchers should determine whether and to what extent
fathers and children suffer measurable sacrifices from applica-
tion of a precise caretaker standard. Studies of these questions
are necessary to critically evaluate arguments for and against
the caretaker preference, which so far have been premised on
theory, speculation and anecdotal evidence.m At the same
time, consideration should continue for alternative preferences
that incorporate a precise standard, but also promote shared
parenting.26
Further studies of standards, however, should not displace
efforts to identify procedural strategies that might avoid de-
structive litigation. Researchers, for example, should continue
to test the effectiveness of the mediation process, although crit-
ics frequently question its usefulness.2 6 A more promising al-
ternative, based on the author's personal observations,266 is a
263. See supra note 94 (question on likelihood of future provision for care);
supra note 120 (absence of evidence tying caretaking with bonding); supra
note 250 and accompanying text (need to assess potential risks in applying
preference). Indeed, the lack of empirical evidence causes advocates to take
uncertain positions:
In the end, there is a disturbing tenuousness about the recommenda-
tions I am able to make. The research points with only a quivering
finger toward the rules that I recommend - indeed, the suggested
rules rest in large part not on hard evidence but on theory, clinical
observations, and even hunch - an educated hunch but a hunch
nevertheless.
Chambers, supra note 43, at 480.
264. See supra notes 216-22.
265. Minnesota's extensive commitment to mediation in custody cases has
been an ingredient in the state's litigation experience in recent years, casting
some tentative doubt on mediation's ability to reduce conflict. See supra note
111. A Twin Cities practitioner volunteers the disturbing observation that me-
diation has served largely to resolve cases in a category always previously set-
tled, thus relieving lawyers in the negotiation process but not reducing
litigation. Minnesota Surveys, supra note 67. See also Chambers, supra note
43, at 480 n.5 and accompanying text (discussing mediation as an alternative to
custody litigation, and therefore, an alternative to any custody standard);
Mnookin, supra note 8, at 287-89 (cautious assessment of prospects for using
mediation to resolve custody disputes).
266. See Crippen & Hatling, supra note 22, at 427 (recommending that chil-
dren be afforded counsel). Between 1975 and 1984, during the author's stint as
a Southwestern Minnesota trial judge, a professional guardian program was
founded and developed for a smaller jurisdiction, a three-county rural area
with a population of about 50,000. This process cost over $100,000 per year for
five active guardians, including three masters-level social workers. In addi-
tion, attorneys for the guardian were appointed where they needed legal ser-
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successful guardian ad litem program, whereby properly edu-
cated and compensated individuals advocate children's interests
in custody disputes.267 Professional guardians can skillfully
avoid litigation because of their allegiance to the interest of the
child, their unique ability to assemble facts, and their opportu-
nity to facilitate parental agreement.m A careful assessment
of the costs and benefits of a professional guardian ad litem
program, however, is a prerequisite to its widespread use.2 69
vice, for trial proceedings or otherwise. The guardians were paid an hourly
rate set according to public welfare salaries for comparable staff; they served
by appointment, and their billing procedure paralleled those used by counsel
appointed by the court.
267. Further inquiry is needed on this alternative process, one which is
aimed at dealing more effectively with the custody issue. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to report on literature regarding professional guardians.
Much of the material comes from Canada and Great Britain, where the con-
cept is better known, and much literature deals with the topic of child protec-
tion proceedings. See, e.g., 0. STONE, THE CH='S VoICE IN THE COURT OF
LAW (1982). For discussion of issues relevant to the guardian issue, see Cham-
bers, supra note 43, at 482-83 (examining problems that result from courts' in-
ability to obtain reliable information from mental health professionals); Meyer
& Schlissel, supra note 86, at 497-99 (discussing proposals for involvement of
behavioral scientists in custody decisionmaking); Mnookin, supra note 8, at
254-55 (although the child's interests are the essential custody issue, the child
normally has no participatory role in the decision process); Pearson & Ring,
supra note 8, at 704-05, 723 (discussing alternatives to traditional decisionmak-
ing and noting judges' common disregard for role of guardian); Note, Lawyer-
ing for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation
Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1187 (1978) (discussing the
ability of child's attorney to act as a mediator); see also Pound, The Place of the
Family Court in the Judicial System, 5 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE A.J. 161,
166-67 (1959) (asserting that judicial decisionmaking in the family context
must strive to preserve balance between justice and security).
268. In the author's trial court experience, professional guardians did three
things better than other combinations of service aimed at resolution of custody
cases. First, they advocated with authority, having the right balance of infor-
mation at hand and skill to assert recommendations. Second, they uncovered
more beneficial facts and reported to the court more thoroughly and with less
equivocation than public employees assigned the investigating task. Finally,
they achieved noteworthy success producing settlements, using the process of
investigation and advocacy to elicit the most conciliatory propositions of par-
ents in conflict. Essentially, the magic of a professional guardian program is
its leveling of the singular authority of the judge and the parents to dominate
the decisionmaking process. At the same time, the role leaves the court pro-
cess intact as a measure to protect all conflicting interests. In a real sense,
some ownership of the process is placed with the child.
269. Unfortunately, empirical data was not assembled on the Southwestern
Minnesota project. This observer has the clear impression that a great deal of
litigation, at and after the time of divorce, was avoided by the work of these
professionals. In addition, they gave strength and stability to children during
the course of the storm. Most of the guardians were tested early by a trial
with vigorous cross-examination, a natural process of counsel to search for vul-
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Finally, if the flood of litigation does not subside, more ef-
fort must be invested to reduce its destructive effects. Espe-
cially important in this regard is the need for reforms to
shorten the litigation process,270 both in the trial courts and on
appeal.2 1 Delay not only increases litigation expenses, but also
prolongs the suffering of parents and children.
Indeed, the millennium is not near in determining an ap-
propriate child custody standard.-72 Even today, the longstand-
ing debate between a rule of law and individualized
decisionmaking remains unsettled. Nevertheless, the past dec-
ade has produced important developments in custody dispute
resolution and alternative approaches to standard-setting. It has
also demonstrated the need for other approaches to accomplish
a reduction in litigation. Minnesota's experiment with the pri-
mary caretaker preference has contributed significantly to this
learning process.
nerability. All but a few survived this process and gained the respect of coun-
sel. Continuously, in a showing of confidence and praise, lawyers and their
clients endorsed the merit of the guardians' services. Funding officials, mostly
conservative rural county commissioners, consistently came to the conclusion
that this program was valuable to the community. For all its value, however, a
professional guardian program costs money. But in dollars and pain saved, the
arrangement is much less costly than suggested by its budgets.
270. Litigation expense, as well as the agony of uncertainty, is complicated
greatly by delay. See supra notes 73-81 (perils for parents and children). In
addition, studying application of the caretaker preference makes it evident
that temporary placements, prolonged by delay, complicate the custody deci-
sion and distort placement standards. See supra notes 151-56 (success of tem-
porary custodian in final placement decisions). In Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427
N.W.2d 203, 207, 209 (Minn. 1988) (Seflow IV), the Minnesota Supreme Court
addressed custody placement standards in a situation made much more com-
plex by the passing of nearly five years between separation of the parents and
final resolution of the case. In fact, the Minnesota law addressing custody is-
sues, MINN. STAT. § 518.168(a) (1990), demands priority for custody disputes in
scheduling of trial court hearings, and the Sefkow IV court urged the trial
courts to bifurcate proceedings to expedite trial of the custody question where
that issue is "vigorously contested." Seflow IV, 427 N.W.2d at 212.
271. As in many cases, much delay in Sejlcow occurred in the appellate pro-
cess; the trial court's initial decision occurred nearly four years before the fi-
nal supreme court decision. See also, e.g., Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d
219 (Minn. 1990) (nearly seventeen months passed between the trial court's
judgment - which was stayed, and which moved custody from the home of
the parent who succeeded on appeal - and the supreme court's final disposi-
tion). Proper fast-tracking of custody appeals will come about only through
new rules that require (1) an unusually early decision to appeal; (2) priority
preparation of transcripts; (3) simplified briefing;, (4) emergency scheduling of
oral arguments; and (5) prompt appellate decisionmaking.
272. See supra notes 16-17.
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